Aligning Learning with Communication in Shared Autonomy

Assistive robot arms can help humans by partially automating their desired tasks. Consider an adult with motor impairments controlling an assistive robot arm to eat dinner. The robot can reduce the number of human inputs -- and how precise those inputs need to be -- by recognizing what the human wants (e.g., a fork) and assisting for that task (e.g., moving towards the fork). Prior research has largely focused on learning the human's task and providing meaningful assistance. But as the robot learns and assists, we also need to ensure that the human understands the robot's intent (e.g., does the human know the robot is reaching for a fork?). In this paper, we study the effects of communicating learned assistance from the robot back to the human operator. We do not focus on the specific interfaces used for communication. Instead, we develop experimental and theoretical models of a) how communication changes the way humans interact with assistive robot arms, and b) how robots can harness these changes to better align with the human's intent. We first conduct online and in-person user studies where participants operate robots that provide partial assistance, and we measure how the human's inputs change with and without communication. With communication, we find that humans are more likely to intervene when the robot incorrectly predicts their intent, and more likely to release control when the robot correctly understands their task. We then use these findings to modify an established robot learning algorithm so that the robot can correctly interpret the human's inputs when communication is present. Our results from a second in-person user study suggest that this combination of communication and learning outperforms assistive systems that isolate either learning or communication.

Should Collaborative Robots be Transparent?

Today's robots often assume that their behavior should be transparent. These transparent (e.g., legible, explainable) robots intentionally choose actions that convey their internal state to nearby humans. But while transparent behavior seems beneficial, is it actually optimal? In this paper we consider collaborative settings where the human and robot have the same objective, and the human is uncertain about the robot's type (i.e., the robot's internal state). We extend a recursive combination of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the Bellman equation to solve for optimal robot policies. Interestingly, we discover that it is not always optimal for collaborative robots to be transparent; instead, human and robot teams can sometimes achieve higher rewards when the robot is opaque. Opaque robots select the same actions regardless of their internal state: because each type of opaque robot behaves in the same way, the human cannot infer the robot's type. Our analysis suggests that opaque behavior becomes optimal when either (a) human-robot interactions have a short time horizon or (b) users are slow to learn from the robot's actions. Across online and in-person user studies with 43 total participants, we find that users reach higher rewards when working with opaque partners, and subjectively rate opaque robots as about equal to transparent robots. See videos of our experiments here: https://youtu.be/u8q1Z7WHUuI

Towards Robots that Influence Humans over Long-Term Interaction

When humans interact with robots influence is inevitable. Consider an autonomous car driving near a human: the speed and steering of the autonomous car will affect how the human drives. Prior works have developed frameworks that enable robots to influence humans towards desired behaviors. But while these approaches are effective in the short-term (i.e., the first few human-robot interactions), here we explore long-term influence (i.e., repeated interactions between the same human and robot). Our central insight is that humans are dynamic: people adapt to robots, and behaviors which are influential now may fall short once the human learns to anticipate the robot's actions. With this insight, we experimentally demonstrate that a prevalent game-theoretic formalism for generating influential robot behaviors becomes less effective over repeated interactions. Next, we propose three modifications to Stackelberg games that make the robot's policy both influential and unpredictable. We finally test these modifications across simulations and user studies: our results suggest that robots which purposely make their actions harder to anticipate are better able to maintain influence over long-term interaction. See videos here: https://youtu.be/ydO83cgjZ2Q