Abstract:As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks. However, there is no standard approach to evaluate tamper resistance. Varied data sets, metrics, and tampering configurations make it difficult to compare safety, utility, and robustness across different models and defenses. To this end, we introduce TamperBench, the first unified framework to systematically evaluate the tamper resistance of LLMs. TamperBench (i) curates a repository of state-of-the-art weight-space fine-tuning attacks and latent-space representation attacks; (ii) enables realistic adversarial evaluation through systematic hyperparameter sweeps per attack-model pair; and (iii) provides both safety and utility evaluations. TamperBench requires minimal additional code to specify any fine-tuning configuration, alignment-stage defense method, and metric suite while ensuring end-to-end reproducibility. We use TamperBench to evaluate 21 open-weight LLMs, including defense-augmented variants, across nine tampering threats using standardized safety and capability metrics with hyperparameter sweeps per model-attack pair. This yields novel insights, including effects of post-training on tamper resistance, that jailbreak-tuning is typically the most severe attack, and that Triplet emerges as a leading alignment-stage defense. Code is available at: https://github.com/criticalml-uw/TamperBench
Abstract:Training large language models (LLMs) is often bottlenecked by extreme memory demands, with optimizer states dominating the footprint. Recent works mitigates this cost by projecting gradients into low-dimensional subspaces using sophisticated update strategies. In this paper, we analyze the dynamics of gradient space and its underlying subspaces. We find that while a small subspace captures most gradient energy, a significant portion still resides in the residual bulk; moreover, the influence of the core subspace diminishes over time and in deeper layers. We also observe that the gradient space exhibits near-flat curvature, calling for algorithms that explicitly account for this geometry. Motivated by these insights, we introduce a suite of randomized algorithms, GrassWalk and GrassJump, which exploit subspace and achieve state-of-the-art memory savings while improving performance on LLaMA-1B and LLaMA-7B pretraining.