Evaluation Awareness Is Not One Capability: Evidence from Open Language Models

Safety benchmarks assume that test-condition behavior predicts deployment behavior, an assumption that fails if models detect evaluation cues and adapt. This opens a gap between benchmark performance and deployment behavior: compliance measured under test conditions becomes an optimistic upper bound that overstates how safely a model behaves once the evaluation harness is removed. We characterize this evaluation awareness through eight experiments across 37 open-weight models and seven families. (i)Detection is moderate and training-driven (24/37 models exceed chance, best AUROC 0.714 vs.0.819 human, with instruction tuning dominating over scale). (ii)Detection shifts safety behavior (hard refusal drops 5.8 percentage points under hypothetical framing, and 21/140 HarmBench framing effects are significant, with compliance rising up to +30 percentage points. (iii)Representations survive behavioral collapse (probes retain AUROC 0.98 under rewrites that drive behavior below chance, and multi-layer steering causally moves three downstream tasks while random controls do not). (iv)These axes are weakly coupled (only 1/15 correlations are significant, the sole robust link being behavioral detection versus framing resistance, $ρ=-0.79$, $p<0.001$). We call this gap the benchmark illusion: because detectability, behavioral manifestation, and controllability vary independently, it is multivariate rather than a single number, so no single awareness score is a reliable proxy for deployment safety.

Chain-of-Sanitized-Thoughts: Plugging PII Leakage in CoT of Large Reasoning Models

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance, reliability, and interpretability by generating explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, but this transparency introduces a serious privacy risk: intermediate reasoning often leaks personally identifiable information (PII) even when final answers are sanitized. We study how to induce privacy-first reasoning, where models reason without exposing sensitive information, using deployable interventions rather than post-hoc redaction. We introduce PII-CoT-Bench, a supervised dataset with privacy-aware CoT annotations, and a category-balanced evaluation benchmark covering realistic and adversarial leakage scenarios. Our results reveal a capability-dependent trend: state-of-the-art models benefit most from prompt-based controls, whereas weaker models require fine-tuning to achieve meaningful leakage reduction. Across models and categories, both approaches substantially reduce PII exposure with minimal degradation in utility, demonstrating that private reasoning can be achieved without sacrificing performance. Overall, we show that private CoT reasoning can be achieved with minimal utility loss, providing practical guidance for building privacy-preserving reasoning systems.