Agentic Microphysics: A Manifesto for Generative AI Safety

This paper advances a methodological proposal for safety research in agentic AI. As systems acquire planning, memory, tool use, persistent identity, and sustained interaction, safety can no longer be analysed primarily at the level of the isolated model. Population-level risks arise from structured interaction among agents, through processes of communication, observation, and mutual influence that shape collective behaviour over time. As the object of analysis shifts, a methodological gap emerges. Approaches focused either on single agents or on aggregate outcomes do not identify the interaction-level mechanisms that generate collective risks or the design variables that control them. A framework is required that links local interaction structure to population-level dynamics in a causally explicit way, allowing both explanation and intervention. We introduce two linked concepts. Agentic microphysics defines the level of analysis: local interaction dynamics where one agent's output becomes another's input under specific protocol conditions. Generative safety defines the methodology: growing phenomena and elicit risks from micro-level conditions to identify sufficient mechanisms, detect thresholds, and design effective interventions.

Institutional AI: Governing LLM Collusion in Multi-Agent Cournot Markets via Public Governance Graphs

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.