Abstract:Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs), an emerging technology proposed for inclusion in next generation wireless communication systems, are programmable surfaces that can adaptively reflect incident electromagnetic radiation in different desired directions. To reduce the complexity and physical profile of conventional RIS designs, a novel concept known as Wave-Controlled RIS has been proposed, in which standing waves along a transmission line are used to generate the required dc bias for reflective control. This paper shows the design of such a Wave-Controlled RIS and its biasing transmission line. The effectiveness of this approach in generating the correct dc bias from a single standing wave frequency is analyzed through both theoretical modeling and experimental validation, which uncovered a dependence on impedance matching not accounted for by the theory. Additionally, the potential for reflective control using only a single standing wave frequency on the biasing transmission line is explored, demonstrating the ability of single-beam steering toward angles near broadside.




Abstract:While reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) technology has been shown to provide numerous benefits to wireless systems, in the hands of an adversary such technology can also be used to disrupt communication links. This paper describes and analyzes an RIS-based attack on multi-antenna wireless systems that operate in time-division duplex mode under the assumption of channel reciprocity. In particular, we show how an RIS with a non-diagonal (ND) phase shift matrix (referred to here as an ND-RIS) can be deployed to maliciously break the channel reciprocity and hence degrade the downlink network performance. Such an attack is entirely passive and difficult to detect. We provide a theoretical analysis of the degradation in the sum ergodic rate that results when an arbitrary malicious ND-RIS is deployed and design an approach based on the genetic algorithm for optimizing the ND structure under partial knowledge of the available channel state information. Our simulation results validate the analysis and demonstrate that an ND-RIS channel reciprocity attack can dramatically reduce the downlink throughput.