Private Algorithms with Private Predictions

When applying differential privacy to sensitive data, a common way of getting improved performance is to use external information such as other sensitive data, public data, or human priors. We propose to use the algorithms with predictions framework -- previously applied largely to improve time complexity or competitive ratios -- as a powerful way of designing and analyzing privacy-preserving methods that can take advantage of such external information to improve utility. For four important tasks -- quantile release, its extension to multiple quantiles, covariance estimation, and data release -- we construct prediction-dependent differentially private methods whose utility scales with natural measures of prediction quality. The analyses enjoy several advantages, including minimal assumptions about the data, natural ways of adding robustness to noisy predictions, and novel "meta" algorithms that can learn predictions from other (potentially sensitive) data. Overall, our results demonstrate how to enable differentially private algorithms to make use of and learn noisy predictions, which holds great promise for improving utility while preserving privacy across a variety of tasks.

Easy Differentially Private Linear Regression

Linear regression is a fundamental tool for statistical analysis. This has motivated the development of linear regression methods that also satisfy differential privacy and thus guarantee that the learned model reveals little about any one data point used to construct it. However, existing differentially private solutions assume that the end user can easily specify good data bounds and hyperparameters. Both present significant practical obstacles. In this paper, we study an algorithm which uses the exponential mechanism to select a model with high Tukey depth from a collection of non-private regression models. Given $n$ samples of $d$-dimensional data used to train $m$ models, we construct an efficient analogue using an approximate Tukey depth that runs in time $O(d^2n + dm\log(m))$. We find that this algorithm obtains strong empirical performance in the data-rich setting with no data bounds or hyperparameter selection required.

Learning with User-Level Privacy

We propose and analyze algorithms to solve a range of learning tasks under user-level differential privacy constraints. Rather than guaranteeing only the privacy of individual samples, user-level DP protects a user's entire contribution ($m \ge 1$ samples), providing more stringent but more realistic protection against information leaks. We show that for high-dimensional mean estimation, empirical risk minimization with smooth losses, stochastic convex optimization, and learning hypothesis class with finite metric entropy, the privacy cost decreases as $O(1/\sqrt{m})$ as users provide more samples. In contrast, when increasing the number of users $n$, the privacy cost decreases at a faster $O(1/n)$ rate. We complement these results with lower bounds showing the worst-case optimality of our algorithm for mean estimation and stochastic convex optimization. Our algorithms rely on novel techniques for private mean estimation in arbitrary dimension with error scaling as the concentration radius $\tau$ of the distribution rather than the entire range. Under uniform convergence, we derive an algorithm that privately answers a sequence of $K$ adaptively chosen queries with privacy cost proportional to $\tau$, and apply it to solve the learning tasks we consider.

Pan-Private Uniformity Testing

A centrally differentially private algorithm maps raw data to differentially private outputs. In contrast, a locally differentially private algorithm may only access data through public interaction with data holders, and this interaction must be a differentially private function of the data. We study the intermediate model of pan-privacy. Unlike a locally private algorithm, a pan-private algorithm receives data in the clear. Unlike a centrally private algorithm, the algorithm receives data one element at a time and must maintain a differentially private internal state while processing this stream. First, we show that pan-privacy against multiple intrusions on the internal state is equivalent to sequentially interactive local privacy. Next, we contextualize pan-privacy against a single intrusion by analyzing the sample complexity of uniformity testing over domain $[k]$. Focusing on the dependence on $k$, centrally private uniformity testing has sample complexity $\Theta(\sqrt{k})$, while noninteractive locally private uniformity testing has sample complexity $\Theta(k)$. We show that the sample complexity of pan-private uniformity testing is $\Theta(k^{2/3})$. By a new $\Omega(k)$ lower bound for the sequentially interactive setting, we also separate pan-private from sequentially interactive locally private and multi-intrusion pan-private uniformity testing.

Repeated Inverse Reinforcement Learning

We introduce a novel repeated Inverse Reinforcement Learning problem: the agent has to act on behalf of a human in a sequence of tasks and wishes to minimize the number of tasks that it surprises the human by acting suboptimally with respect to how the human would have acted. Each time the human is surprised, the agent is provided a demonstration of the desired behavior by the human. We formalize this problem, including how the sequence of tasks is chosen, in a few different ways and provide some foundational results.

Towards Resolving Unidentifiability in Inverse Reinforcement Learning

We consider a setting for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) where the learner is extended with the ability to actively select multiple environments, observing an agent's behavior on each environment. We first demonstrate that if the learner can experiment with any transition dynamics on some fixed set of states and actions, then there exists an algorithm that reconstructs the agent's reward function to the fullest extent theoretically possible, and that requires only a small (logarithmic) number of experiments. We contrast this result to what is known about IRL in single fixed environments, namely that the true reward function is fundamentally unidentifiable. We then extend this setting to the more realistic case where the learner may not select any transition dynamic, but rather is restricted to some fixed set of environments that it may try. We connect the problem of maximizing the information derived from experiments to submodular function maximization and demonstrate that a greedy algorithm is near optimal (up to logarithmic factors). Finally, we empirically validate our algorithm on an environment inspired by behavioral psychology.

Online Learning and Profit Maximization from Revealed Preferences

We consider the problem of learning from revealed preferences in an online setting. In our framework, each period a consumer buys an optimal bundle of goods from a merchant according to her (linear) utility function and current prices, subject to a budget constraint. The merchant observes only the purchased goods, and seeks to adapt prices to optimize his profits. We give an efficient algorithm for the merchant's problem that consists of a learning phase in which the consumer's utility function is (perhaps partially) inferred, followed by a price optimization step. We also consider an alternative online learning algorithm for the setting where prices are set exogenously, but the merchant would still like to predict the bundle that will be bought by the consumer for purposes of inventory or supply chain management. In contrast with most prior work on the revealed preferences problem, we demonstrate that by making stronger assumptions on the form of utility functions, efficient algorithms for both learning and profit maximization are possible, even in adaptive, online settings.

Learning Prices for Repeated Auctions with Strategic Buyers

Inspired by real-time ad exchanges for online display advertising, we consider the problem of inferring a buyer's value distribution for a good when the buyer is repeatedly interacting with a seller through a posted-price mechanism. We model the buyer as a strategic agent, whose goal is to maximize her long-term surplus, and we are interested in mechanisms that maximize the seller's long-term revenue. We define the natural notion of strategic regret --- the lost revenue as measured against a truthful (non-strategic) buyer. We present seller algorithms that are no-(strategic)-regret when the buyer discounts her future surplus --- i.e. the buyer prefers showing advertisements to users sooner rather than later. We also give a lower bound on strategic regret that increases as the buyer's discounting weakens and shows, in particular, that any seller algorithm will suffer linear strategic regret if there is no discounting.

Graphical Models for Bandit Problems

We introduce a rich class of graphical models for multi-armed bandit problems that permit both the state or context space and the action space to be very large, yet succinctly specify the payoffs for any context-action pair. Our main result is an algorithm for such models whose regret is bounded by the number of parameters and whose running time depends only on the treewidth of the graph substructure induced by the action space.