PoiCGAN: A Targeted Poisoning Based on Feature-Label Joint Perturbation in Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL), as a popular distributed learning paradigm, has shown outstanding performance in improving computational efficiency and protecting data privacy, and is widely applied in industrial image classification. However, due to its distributed nature, FL is vulnerable to threats from malicious clients, with poisoning attacks being a common threat. A major limitation of existing poisoning attack methods is their difficulty in bypassing model performance tests and defense mechanisms based on model anomaly detection. This often results in the detection and removal of poisoned models, which undermines their practical utility. To ensure both the performance of industrial image classification and attacks, we propose a targeted poisoning attack, PoiCGAN, based on feature-label collaborative perturbation. Our method modifies the inputs of the discriminator and generator in the Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (CGAN) to influence the training process, generating an ideal poison generator. This generator not only produces specific poisoned samples but also automatically performs label flipping. Experiments across various datasets show that our method achieves an attack success rate 83.97% higher than baseline methods, with a less than 8.87% reduction in the main task's accuracy. Moreover, the poisoned samples and malicious models exhibit high stealthiness.

Act in Collusion: A Persistent Distributed Multi-Target Backdoor in Federated Learning

Federated learning, a novel paradigm designed to protect data privacy, is vulnerable to backdoor attacks due to its distributed nature. Current research often designs attacks based on a single attacker with a single backdoor, overlooking more realistic and complex threats in federated learning. We propose a more practical threat model for federated learning: the distributed multi-target backdoor. In this model, multiple attackers control different clients, embedding various triggers and targeting different classes, collaboratively implanting backdoors into the global model via central aggregation. Empirical validation shows that existing methods struggle to maintain the effectiveness of multiple backdoors in the global model. Our key insight is that similar backdoor triggers cause parameter conflicts and injecting new backdoors disrupts gradient directions, significantly weakening some backdoors performance. To solve this, we propose a Distributed Multi-Target Backdoor Attack (DMBA), ensuring efficiency and persistence of backdoors from different malicious clients. To avoid parameter conflicts, we design a multi-channel dispersed frequency trigger strategy to maximize trigger differences. To mitigate gradient interference, we introduce backdoor replay in local training to neutralize conflicting gradients. Extensive validation shows that 30 rounds after the attack, Attack Success Rates of three different backdoors from various clients remain above 93%. The code will be made publicly available after the review period.