Abstract:Classical coding-theoretic guarantees often rely on trust assumptions, such as requiring sufficiently many honest nodes compared with adversarial ones. These assumptions are difficult to enforce in open decentralized systems where participants are not centrally certified. At the same time, such environments often contain incentive mechanisms: participants may be rewarded only when their submitted data are accepted and the system remains functional. This changes the role of an adversary. Rather than acting as a pure saboteur, a strategic adversary may submit data that are consistent enough to be accepted while still degrading the quality of the final estimate. The game-of-coding framework models this strategic interaction between a data collector (DC) and an adversary. Existing works on the game of coding mostly consider the complete-information case, where the DC knows how the adversary trades off acceptance and estimation error. In this paper, we study an incomplete-information version of the game of coding in which the DC, acting as a Stackelberg leader, does not know the adversary's utility trade-off and must learn through repeated interaction. Prior work on the unknown-adversary setting considered an explore-then-commit objective, where only the final selected acceptance rule is evaluated. In contrast, we study the full learning trajectory: every acceptance rule used during the algorithm is executed and contributes to performance. We propose an algorithm that refines its search around promising acceptance rules, prove that it achieves sublinear cumulative regret, and evaluate its performance through numerical experiments.
Abstract:Coding theory plays a crucial role in enabling reliable communication, storage, and computation. Classical approaches assume a worst-case adversarial model and ensure error correction and data recovery only when the number of honest nodes exceeds the number of adversarial ones by some margin. However, in some emerging decentralized applications, particularly in decentralized machine learning (DeML), participating nodes are rewarded for accepted contributions. This incentive structure naturally gives rise to rational adversaries who act strategically rather than behaving in purely malicious ways. In this paper, we first motivate the need for coding in the presence of rational adversaries, particularly in the context of outsourced computation in decentralized systems. We contrast this need with existing approaches and highlight their limitations. We then introduce the game of coding, a novel game-theoretic framework that extends coding theory to trust-minimized settings where honest nodes are not in the majority. Focusing on repetition coding, we highlight two key features of this framework: (1) the ability to achieve a non-zero probability of data recovery even when adversarial nodes are in the majority, and (2) Sybil resistance, i.e., the equilibrium remains unchanged even as the number of adversarial nodes increases. Finally, we explore scenarios in which the adversary's strategy is unknown and outline several open problems for future research.
Abstract:Coding theory plays a crucial role in ensuring data integrity and reliability across various domains, from communication to computation and storage systems. However, its reliance on trust assumptions for data recovery poses significant challenges, particularly in emerging decentralized systems where trust is scarce. To address this, the game of coding framework was introduced, offering insights into strategies for data recovery within incentive-oriented environments. The focus of the earliest version of the game of coding was limited to scenarios involving only two nodes. This paper investigates the implications of increasing the number of nodes in the game of coding framework, particularly focusing on scenarios with one honest node and multiple adversarial nodes. We demonstrate that despite the increased flexibility for the adversary with an increasing number of adversarial nodes, having more power is not beneficial for the adversary and is not detrimental to the data collector, making this scheme sybil-resistant. Furthermore, we outline optimal strategies for the data collector in terms of accepting or rejecting the inputs, and characterize the optimal noise distribution for the adversary.