A Cognitive Distribution and Behavior-Consistent Framework for Black-Box Attacks on Recommender Systems

With the growing deployment of sequential recommender systems in e-commerce and other fields, their black-box interfaces raise security concerns: models are vulnerable to extraction and subsequent adversarial manipulation. Existing black-box extraction attacks primarily rely on hard labels or pairwise learning, often ignoring the importance of ranking positions, which results in incomplete knowledge transfer. Moreover, adversarial sequences generated via pure gradient methods lack semantic consistency with real user behavior, making them easily detectable. To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes a dual-enhanced attack framework. First, drawing on primacy effects and position bias, we introduce a cognitive distribution-driven extraction mechanism that maps discrete rankings into continuous value distributions with position-aware decay, thereby advancing from order alignment to cognitive distribution alignment. Second, we design a behavior-aware noisy item generation strategy that jointly optimizes collaborative signals and gradient signals. This ensures both semantic coherence and statistical stealth while effectively promoting target item rankings. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms existing methods in both attack success rate and evasion rate, validating the value of integrating cognitive modeling and behavioral consistency for secure recommender systems.

Agent Tools Orchestration Leaks More: Dataset, Benchmark, and Mitigation

Driven by Large Language Models, the single-agent, multi-tool architecture has become a popular paradigm for autonomous agents due to its simplicity and effectiveness. However, this architecture also introduces a new and severe privacy risk, which we term Tools Orchestration Privacy Risk (TOP-R), where an agent, to achieve a benign user goal, autonomously aggregates information fragments across multiple tools and leverages its reasoning capabilities to synthesize unexpected sensitive information. We provide the first systematic study of this risk. First, we establish a formal framework, attributing the risk's root cause to the agent's misaligned objective function: an overoptimization for helpfulness while neglecting privacy awareness. Second, we construct TOP-Bench, comprising paired leakage and benign scenarios, to comprehensively evaluate this risk. To quantify the trade-off between safety and robustness, we introduce the H-Score as a holistic metric. The evaluation results reveal that TOP-R is a severe risk: the average Risk Leakage Rate (RLR) of eight representative models reaches 90.24%, while the average H-Score is merely 0.167, with no model exceeding 0.3. Finally, we propose the Privacy Enhancement Principle (PEP) method, which effectively mitigates TOP-R, reducing the Risk Leakage Rate to 46.58% and significantly improving the H-Score to 0.624. Our work reveals both a new class of risk and inherent structural limitations in current agent architectures, while also offering feasible mitigation strategies.

Libra: Large Chinese-based Safeguard for AI Content

Large language models (LLMs) excel in text understanding and generation but raise significant safety and ethical concerns in high-stakes applications. To mitigate these risks, we present Libra-Guard, a cutting-edge safeguard system designed to enhance the safety of Chinese-based LLMs. Leveraging a two-stage curriculum training pipeline, Libra-Guard enhances data efficiency by employing guard pretraining on synthetic samples, followed by fine-tuning on high-quality, real-world data, thereby significantly reducing reliance on manual annotations. To enable rigorous safety evaluations, we also introduce Libra-Test, the first benchmark specifically designed to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguard systems for Chinese content. It covers seven critical harm scenarios and includes over 5,700 samples annotated by domain experts. Experiments show that Libra-Guard achieves 86.79% accuracy, outperforming Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct (74.33%) and ShieldLM-Qwen-14B-Chat (65.69%), and nearing closed-source models like Claude-3.5-Sonnet and GPT-4o. These contributions establish a robust framework for advancing the safety governance of Chinese LLMs and represent a tentative step toward developing safer, more reliable Chinese AI systems.