Abstract:This paper proposes an empirical methodology to study software aging in GPU-based LLM serving systems. Traditional aging studies focus on CPU-centric software with relatively regular workloads; LLM serving is different, spanning a Python host and a CUDA device, handling requests whose cost varies by orders of magnitude, and relying on rapidly evolving software stacks. We run a 216-hour campaign across six co-located deployments under identical stress conditions, monitor host, device, and client metrics in parallel, and apply a statistical pipeline that accounts for autocorrelation and multiple testing. Our results reveal statistically significant memory aging in all deployments, with leak rates strongly dependent on the serving runtime and deployment configuration. Beyond these findings, we provide a reproducible framework that opens a research direction at the intersection of the software aging and rejuvenation and LLM serving communities.
Abstract:Producing a labeled vulnerable code at scale is a recurring obstacle for learning-based vulnerability detection: mined corpora carry substantial label noise, and existing LLM-based augmentation propagates these inaccuracies because it transforms vulnerable seeds rather than synthesising vulnerabilities from a specification. A complementary route is to start from safe code and ask an instruction-tuned LLM to inject a specified CWE (which would shift the labeling burden from open-ended detection to bounded binary confirmation) but safety-aligned code LLMs systematically refuse such prompts. This paper is a preliminary feasibility study of abliteration, a low-rank weight edit that orthogonally projects out the refusal direction in the residual stream, as a tool to remove this barrier. We use Python and CWE-89 (SQL injection) as a case study, evaluating the Qwen2.5-Coder-Instruct family at 3B, 7B, and 14B parameters on safe samples drawn from PromSec and SafeCoder, replicated three times per condition. We find that (i) refusal on injection prompts is strongly size- and prompt-context-dependent: the 14B refuses 100% of prompts, the 7B refuses 73% of PromSec but only 5% of SafeCoder, whereas the 3B is essentially never blocked; (ii) abliteration reduces refusal to zero or near-zero across all sizes while leaving syntactic validity above 93%, supporting the view that, in this setting, refusal can be detached from measured code-generation capability; and (iii) the post-abliteration injection rate remains capacity-bound (88-97% on the 14B, 89-90% on the 7B, and 25-48% on the 3B) separating willingness, which abliteration unlocks, from capability, which scales with parameters. Vulnerability verdicts are produced by a three-tool detector ensemble (CodeQL, Semgrep, Bandit) followed by manual adjudication by two authors on detector-positive outputs.
Abstract:This paper presents PyResBugs, a curated dataset of residual bugs, i.e., defects that persist undetected during traditional testing but later surface in production, collected from major Python frameworks. Each bug in the dataset is paired with its corresponding fault-free (fixed) version and annotated with multi-level natural language (NL) descriptions. These NL descriptions enable natural language-driven fault injection, offering a novel approach to simulating real-world faults in software systems. By bridging the gap between software fault injection techniques and real-world representativeness, PyResBugs provides researchers with a high-quality resource for advancing AI-driven automated testing in Python systems.




Abstract:This practical experience report explores Neural Machine Translation (NMT) models' capability to generate offensive security code from natural language (NL) descriptions, highlighting the significance of contextual understanding and its impact on model performance. Our study employs a dataset comprising real shellcodes to evaluate the models across various scenarios, including missing information, necessary context, and unnecessary context. The experiments are designed to assess the models' resilience against incomplete descriptions, their proficiency in leveraging context for enhanced accuracy, and their ability to discern irrelevant information. The findings reveal that the introduction of contextual data significantly improves performance. However, the benefits of additional context diminish beyond a certain point, indicating an optimal level of contextual information for model training. Moreover, the models demonstrate an ability to filter out unnecessary context, maintaining high levels of accuracy in the generation of offensive security code. This study paves the way for future research on optimizing context use in AI-driven code generation, particularly for applications requiring a high degree of technical precision such as the generation of offensive code.




Abstract:Recent advances of artificial intelligence (AI) code generators are opening new opportunities in software security research, including misuse by malicious actors. We review use cases for AI code generators for security and introduce an evaluation benchmark.




Abstract:In this paper, we propose a fully automated method, named ACCA, to evaluate the correctness of AI-generated code for security purposes. The method uses symbolic execution to assess whether the AI-generated code behaves as a reference implementation. We use ACCA to assess four state-of-the-art models trained to generate security-oriented assembly code and compare the results of the evaluation with different baseline solutions, including output similarity metrics, widely used in the field, and the well-known ChatGPT, the AI-powered language model developed by OpenAI. Our experiments show that our method outperforms the baseline solutions and assesses the correctness of the AI-generated code similar to the human-based evaluation, which is considered the ground truth for the assessment in the field. Moreover, ACCA has a very strong correlation with human evaluation (Pearson's correlation coefficient r=0.84 on average). Finally, since it is a fully automated solution that does not require any human intervention, the proposed method performs the assessment of every code snippet in ~0.17s on average, which is definitely lower than the average time required by human analysts to manually inspect the code, based on our experience.




Abstract:In this work, we assess the security of AI code generators via data poisoning, i.e., an attack that injects malicious samples into the training data to generate vulnerable code. We poison the training data by injecting increasing amounts of code containing security vulnerabilities and assess the attack's success on different state-of-the-art models for code generation. Our analysis shows that AI code generators are vulnerable to even a small amount of data poisoning. Moreover, the attack does not impact the correctness of code generated by pre-trained models, making it hard to detect.
Abstract:In this work, we present a method to add perturbations to the code descriptions, i.e., new inputs in natural language (NL) from well-intentioned developers, in the context of security-oriented code, and analyze how and to what extent perturbations affect the performance of AI offensive code generators. Our experiments show that the performance of the code generators is highly affected by perturbations in the NL descriptions. To enhance the robustness of the code generators, we use the method to perform data augmentation, i.e., to increase the variability and diversity of the training data, proving its effectiveness against both perturbed and non-perturbed code descriptions.




Abstract:AI-based code generators are an emerging solution for automatically writing programs starting from descriptions in natural language, by using deep neural networks (Neural Machine Translation, NMT). In particular, code generators have been used for ethical hacking and offensive security testing by generating proof-of-concept attacks. Unfortunately, the evaluation of code generators still faces several issues. The current practice uses automatic metrics, which compute the textual similarity of generated code with ground-truth references. However, it is not clear what metric to use, and which metric is most suitable for specific contexts. This practical experience report analyzes a large set of output similarity metrics on offensive code generators. We apply the metrics on two state-of-the-art NMT models using two datasets containing offensive assembly and Python code with their descriptions in the English language. We compare the estimates from the automatic metrics with human evaluation and provide practical insights into their strengths and limitations.




Abstract:Proactive approaches to security, such as adversary emulation, leverage information about threat actors and their techniques (Cyber Threat Intelligence, CTI). However, most CTI still comes in unstructured forms (i.e., natural language), such as incident reports and leaked documents. To support proactive security efforts, we present an experimental study on the automatic classification of unstructured CTI into attack techniques using machine learning (ML). We contribute with two new datasets for CTI analysis, and we evaluate several ML models, including both traditional and deep learning-based ones. We present several lessons learned about how ML can perform at this task, which classifiers perform best and under which conditions, which are the main causes of classification errors, and the challenges ahead for CTI analysis.