Abstract:Modern AI agent implementations such as frontier coding agents chain multiple tools at runtime that create a security surface that per-tool guardrails are unable to address, as individually permitted tools can violate organizational policies when composed. We propose the Dynamic Security Control Compositor (DSCC), a two-phase approach to compositional security for multi-tool agent chains. In Phase 1, at session checkout, a Most Restrictive Set (MRS) algorithm composes per-tool security policies into a single effective policy with a formal monotonicity invariant that extending a chain can only tighten the result, blocking incompatible combinations before any tool executes. Outputs of any tool call propagate their classification constraints into a session-level taint state, so subsequent invocations must satisfy the most restrictive constraints seen so far. In Phase 2, at runtime, the system tracks the sensitivity of data the agent touches through a monotonic taint state and revokes the session if the accumulated exposure would make a subsequent tool call a policy violation. Together, these phases provide defense in depth, where static composition prevents unsafe chains from starting, and runtime taint tracking catches violations that emerge from the specific data used. We provide a reference implementation on 32 tools governed by 16 NIST SP 800-53 aligned policies and evaluate it under two composition modes. In the default clearance mode, permitted combinations are partitioned into classification-level clusters, blocking 79.2% of policy pairs and 95.5% of triples. The alternative taint mode admits mixed-classification chains within the exfiltration boundary, blocking 42.5% and 60.5% respectively. We discuss the governance implications for organizations deploying multi-tool agents, including the utility-security tradeoff and the changes needed to operationalize chain-aware policies.
Abstract:Current model training approaches incorporate user information directly into shared weights, making individual data removal computationally infeasible without retraining. This paper presents a three-layer architecture that decouples personal data from shared weights by combining a static base model, composable domain-expert LoRA adapters that shape behavior without imparting user data, and per-user proxy artefacts whose deletion constitutes deterministic unlearning. Evaluation on Phi-3.5-mini and Llama-3.1-8B confirms per-user differentiation in which personal data influences outputs while remaining isolated, verified by a return to baseline after proxy removal (KL divergence of approximately 0.21 nats, 82-89% verification pass rate) and near-zero cross-user contamination. Because user-specific information never enters shared weights, the architecture mitigates model inversion, membership inference, and training-data extraction against shared model components by construction. The approach converts machine unlearning from an intractable weight-editing problem into a deterministic deletion operation that preserves personalization alongside privacy-enhancing guarantees and is compatible with differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) for privacy-preserving shared model improvement.
Abstract:We introduce Imagen 3, a latent diffusion model that generates high quality images from text prompts. We describe our quality and responsibility evaluations. Imagen 3 is preferred over other state-of-the-art (SOTA) models at the time of evaluation. In addition, we discuss issues around safety and representation, as well as methods we used to minimize the potential harm of our models.
Abstract:In this report, we present the latest model of the Gemini family, Gemini 1.5 Pro, a highly compute-efficient multimodal mixture-of-experts model capable of recalling and reasoning over fine-grained information from millions of tokens of context, including multiple long documents and hours of video and audio. Gemini 1.5 Pro achieves near-perfect recall on long-context retrieval tasks across modalities, improves the state-of-the-art in long-document QA, long-video QA and long-context ASR, and matches or surpasses Gemini 1.0 Ultra's state-of-the-art performance across a broad set of benchmarks. Studying the limits of Gemini 1.5 Pro's long-context ability, we find continued improvement in next-token prediction and near-perfect retrieval (>99%) up to at least 10M tokens, a generational leap over existing models such as Claude 2.1 (200k) and GPT-4 Turbo (128k). Finally, we highlight surprising new capabilities of large language models at the frontier; when given a grammar manual for Kalamang, a language with fewer than 200 speakers worldwide, the model learns to translate English to Kalamang at a similar level to a person who learned from the same content.
Abstract:Generative AI systems produce a range of risks. To ensure the safety of generative AI systems, these risks must be evaluated. In this paper, we make two main contributions toward establishing such evaluations. First, we propose a three-layered framework that takes a structured, sociotechnical approach to evaluating these risks. This framework encompasses capability evaluations, which are the main current approach to safety evaluation. It then reaches further by building on system safety principles, particularly the insight that context determines whether a given capability may cause harm. To account for relevant context, our framework adds human interaction and systemic impacts as additional layers of evaluation. Second, we survey the current state of safety evaluation of generative AI systems and create a repository of existing evaluations. Three salient evaluation gaps emerge from this analysis. We propose ways forward to closing these gaps, outlining practical steps as well as roles and responsibilities for different actors. Sociotechnical safety evaluation is a tractable approach to the robust and comprehensive safety evaluation of generative AI systems.