Semantic Intent Fragmentation: A Single-Shot Compositional Attack on Multi-Agent AI Pipelines

We introduce Semantic Intent Fragmentation (SIF), an attack class against LLM orchestration systems where a single, legitimately phrased request causes an orchestrator to decompose a task into subtasks that are individually benign but jointly violate security policy. Current safety mechanisms operate at the subtask level, so each step clears existing classifiers -- the violation only emerges at the composed plan. SIF exploits OWASP LLM06:2025 through four mechanisms: bulk scope escalation, silent data exfiltration, embedded trigger deployment, and quasi-identifier aggregation, requiring no injected content, no system modification, and no attacker interaction after the initial request. We construct a three-stage red-teaming pipeline grounded in OWASP, MITRE ATLAS, and NIST frameworks to generate realistic enterprise scenarios. Across 14 scenarios spanning financial reporting, information security, and HR analytics, a GPT-20B orchestrator produces policy-violating plans in 71% of cases (10/14) while every subtask appears benign. Three independent signals validate this: deterministic taint analysis, chain-of-thought evaluation, and a cross-model compliance judge with 0% false positives. Stronger orchestrators increase SIF success rates. Plan-level information-flow tracking combined with compliance evaluation detects all attacks before execution, showing the compositional safety gap is closable.

Agent-Fence: Mapping Security Vulnerabilities Across Deep Research Agents

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from $0.29 \pm 0.04$ (LangGraph) to $0.51 \pm 0.07$ (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet ($0.62 \pm 0.08$), Authorization Confusion ($0.54 \pm 0.10$), Retrieval Poisoning ($0.47 \pm 0.09$), and Planning Manipulation ($0.44 \pm 0.11$), while prompt-centric classes remain below $0.20$ under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking ($ρ\approx 0.63$ and $ρ\approx 0.58$). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.

Agentic Physical AI toward a Domain-Specific Foundation Model for Nuclear Reactor Control

The prevailing paradigm in AI for physical systems, scaling general-purpose foundation models toward universal multimodal reasoning, confronts a fundamental barrier at the control interface. Recent benchmarks show that even frontier vision-language models achieve only 50-53% accuracy on basic quantitative physics tasks, behaving as approximate guessers that preserve semantic plausibility while violating physical constraints. This input unfaithfulness is not a scaling deficiency but a structural limitation. Perception-centric architectures optimize parameter-space imitation, whereas safety-critical control demands outcome-space guarantees over executed actions. Here, we present a fundamentally different pathway toward domain-specific foundation models by introducing compact language models operating as Agentic Physical AI, in which policy optimization is driven by physics-based validation rather than perceptual inference. We train a 360-million-parameter model on synthetic reactor control scenarios, scaling the dataset from 10^3 to 10^5 examples. This induces a sharp phase transition absent in general-purpose models. Small-scale systems exhibit high-variance imitation with catastrophic tail risk, while large-scale models undergo variance collapse exceeding 500x reduction, stabilizing execution-level behavior. Despite balanced exposure to four actuation families, the model autonomously rejects approximately 70% of the training distribution and concentrates 95% of runtime execution on a single-bank strategy. Learned representations transfer across distinct physics and continuous input modalities without architectural modification.

ReactorFold: Generative discovery of nuclear reactor cores via emergent physical reasoning

Designing nuclear reactor cores requires navigating large discrete design spaces governed by complex neutronic interactions. Traditional deterministic, metaheuristic, and machine-learning-assisted methods search within fixed, human-defined configuration spaces, limiting their ability to discover fundamentally new design topologies. Here we introduce ReactorFold, a generative framework that reformulates fuel-assembly design as a sequence modeling problem for language models. Using Monte Carlo data, parameter-efficient fine-tuning, and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), the model learns the latent structure of a pressurized-water-reactor assembly and generates candidate layouts in a single forward pass. Notably, the DPO-aligned model exhibits emergent design-space expansion: despite being trained exclusively on configurations with a fixed number of gadolinium burnable absorber (Gd) rods, it autonomously adjusts Gd inventory to satisfy strict power-peaking constraints. The model also discovers high-performing asymmetric configurations that challenge conventional symmetric loading heuristics, accessing design regimes inaccessible to conventional search methods and demonstrating that language models can internalize causal physical relationships and transcend human-imposed design constraints.