HoloGeo: Mitigating Landmark Bias in Geo-localization via Evidence-Driven Reasoning

Recent advances in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have significantly improved image geo-localization, yet existing models remain susceptible to landmark bias, causing them to overlook geographical cues or form spurious correlations, ultimately resulting in inaccurate localization. To systematically investigate this issue, we first design two quantitative metrics, Bias Intensity (BI) and Bias Harmfulness (BH), to characterize the impact of landmarks exerted on model reasoning, and establish a comprehensive benchmark, LandmarkBias-3K. To mitigate landmark bias, we further propose an evidence-driven reasoning framework, HoloGeo, to improve the reliability of geo-localization. HoloGeo is supported by a high-quality dataset, BF-30k, annotated with structured multi-evidence bias-free reasoning chains. By incorporating multi-dimensional rewards, HoloGeo explicitly encourages balanced attention over diverse visual cues and achieves evidence-driven joint reasoning. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HoloGeo not only maintains excellent performance on IM2GPS3K and YFCC4k but also significantly outperforms existing open-source VLMs on LandmarkBias-3K, validating its effectiveness for robust geospatial reasoning.

Robust Harmful Features Under Jailbreak Attacks: Mechanistic Evidence from Attention Head Specialization in Large Language Models

Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood. We provide evidence that attacks do not comprehensively eliminate safety features, but instead selectively suppress specific attention heads. We identify two functionally differentiated types: Adversarially Compromised Heads (ACHs) concentrated in early layers, which are suppressed under attacks, and Safety-Aligned Heads (SAHs) in mid-layers, which maintain robust activations even when attacks succeed. Ablation studies support the causal role of ACHs and the contribution of SAHs to robust activations: suppressing a small number of ACHs is sufficient to induce jailbreak-like behavior on normally refused inputs, while removing SAHs substantially weakens mid-layer safety activations. Token-level attribution further shows that ACH suppression is driven specifically by attack-template tokens, providing a mechanistic account of why attacks can bypass refusal decisions through ACH suppression while leaving internal safety signals sustained by SAHs -- a phenomenon we term Robust Harmful Features. To validate the practical significance of this robustness, we show that simply reading these persistent activations -- without any training -- yields competitive aggregate detection performance with strong adversarial robustness.