DC-SGD: Differentially Private SGD with Dynamic Clipping through Gradient Norm Distribution Estimation

Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) is a widely adopted technique for privacy-preserving deep learning. A critical challenge in DP-SGD is selecting the optimal clipping threshold C, which involves balancing the trade-off between clipping bias and noise magnitude, incurring substantial privacy and computing overhead during hyperparameter tuning. In this paper, we propose Dynamic Clipping DP-SGD (DC-SGD), a framework that leverages differentially private histograms to estimate gradient norm distributions and dynamically adjust the clipping threshold C. Our framework includes two novel mechanisms: DC-SGD-P and DC-SGD-E. DC-SGD-P adjusts the clipping threshold based on a percentile of gradient norms, while DC-SGD-E minimizes the expected squared error of gradients to optimize C. These dynamic adjustments significantly reduce the burden of hyperparameter tuning C. The extensive experiments on various deep learning tasks, including image classification and natural language processing, show that our proposed dynamic algorithms achieve up to 9 times acceleration on hyperparameter tuning than DP-SGD. And DC-SGD-E can achieve an accuracy improvement of 10.62% on CIFAR10 than DP-SGD under the same privacy budget of hyperparameter tuning. We conduct rigorous theoretical privacy and convergence analyses, showing that our methods seamlessly integrate with the Adam optimizer. Our results highlight the robust performance and efficiency of DC-SGD, offering a practical solution for differentially private deep learning with reduced computational overhead and enhanced privacy guarantees.

R.R.: Unveiling LLM Training Privacy through Recollection and Ranking

Large Language Models (LLMs) pose significant privacy risks, potentially leaking training data due to implicit memorization. Existing privacy attacks primarily focus on membership inference attacks (MIAs) or data extraction attacks, but reconstructing specific personally identifiable information (PII) in LLM's training data remains challenging. In this paper, we propose R.R. (Recollect and Rank), a novel two-step privacy stealing attack that enables attackers to reconstruct PII entities from scrubbed training data where the PII entities have been masked. In the first stage, we introduce a prompt paradigm named recollection, which instructs the LLM to repeat a masked text but fill in masks. Then we can use PII identifiers to extract recollected PII candidates. In the second stage, we design a new criterion to score each PII candidate and rank them. Motivated by membership inference, we leverage the reference model as a calibration to our criterion. Experiments across three popular PII datasets demonstrate that the R.R. achieves better PII identical performance compared to baselines. These results highlight the vulnerability of LLMs to PII leakage even when training data has been scrubbed. We release the replicate package of R.R. at a link.