Constrained Adaptive Attacks: Realistic Evaluation of Adversarial Examples and Robust Training of Deep Neural Networks for Tabular Data

State-of-the-art deep learning models for tabular data have recently achieved acceptable performance to be deployed in industrial settings. However, the robustness of these models remains scarcely explored. Contrary to computer vision, there is to date no realistic protocol to properly evaluate the adversarial robustness of deep tabular models due to intrinsic properties of tabular data such as categorical features, immutability, and feature relationship constraints. To fill this gap, we propose CAA, the first efficient evasion attack for constrained tabular deep learning models. CAA is an iterative parameter-free attack that combines gradient and search attacks to generate adversarial examples under constraints. We leverage CAA to build a benchmark of deep tabular models across three popular use cases: credit scoring, phishing and botnet attacks detection. Our benchmark supports ten threat models with increasing capabilities of the attacker, and reflects real-world attack scenarios for each use case. Overall, our results demonstrate how domain knowledge, adversarial training, and attack budgets impact the robustness assessment of deep tabular models and provide security practitioners with a set of recommendations to improve the robustness of deep tabular models against various evasion attack scenarios.

On The Empirical Effectiveness of Unrealistic Adversarial Hardening Against Realistic Adversarial Attacks

While the literature on security attacks and defense of Machine Learning (ML) systems mostly focuses on unrealistic adversarial examples, recent research has raised concern about the under-explored field of realistic adversarial attacks and their implications on the robustness of real-world systems. Our paper paves the way for a better understanding of adversarial robustness against realistic attacks and makes two major contributions. First, we conduct a study on three real-world use cases (text classification, botnet detection, malware detection)) and five datasets in order to evaluate whether unrealistic adversarial examples can be used to protect models against realistic examples. Our results reveal discrepancies across the use cases, where unrealistic examples can either be as effective as the realistic ones or may offer only limited improvement. Second, to explain these results, we analyze the latent representation of the adversarial examples generated with realistic and unrealistic attacks. We shed light on the patterns that discriminate which unrealistic examples can be used for effective hardening. We release our code, datasets and models to support future research in exploring how to reduce the gap between unrealistic and realistic adversarial attacks.

A Unified Framework for Adversarial Attack and Defense in Constrained Feature Space

The generation of feasible adversarial examples is necessary for properly assessing models that work on constrained feature space. However, it remains a challenging task to enforce constraints into attacks that were designed for computer vision. We propose a unified framework to generate feasible adversarial examples that satisfy given domain constraints. Our framework supports the use cases reported in the literature and can handle both linear and non-linear constraints. We instantiate our framework into two algorithms: a gradient-based attack that introduces constraints in the loss function to maximize, and a multi-objective search algorithm that aims for misclassification, perturbation minimization, and constraint satisfaction. We show that our approach is effective on two datasets from different domains, with a success rate of up to 100%, where state-of-the-art attacks fail to generate a single feasible example. In addition to adversarial retraining, we propose to introduce engineered non-convex constraints to improve model adversarial robustness. We demonstrate that this new defense is as effective as adversarial retraining. Our framework forms the starting point for research on constrained adversarial attacks and provides relevant baselines and datasets that future research can exploit.