Adaptive Contracts for Cost-Effective AI Delegation

When organizations delegate text generation tasks to AI providers via pay-for-performance contracts, expected payments rise when evaluation is noisy. As evaluation methods become more elaborate, the economic benefits of decreased noise are often overshadowed by increased evaluation costs. In this work, we introduce adaptive contracts for AI delegation, which allow detailed evaluation to be performed selectively after observing an initial coarse signal in order to conserve resources. We make three sets of contributions: First, we provide efficient algorithms for computing optimal adaptive contracts under natural assumptions or when core problem dimensions are small, and prove hardness of approximation in the general unstructured case. We then formulate alternative models of randomized adaptive contracts and discuss their benefits and limitations. Finally, we empirically demonstrate the benefits of adaptivity over non-adaptive baselines using question-answering and code-generation datasets.

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities with Correlations

We initiate the study of the prophet inequality problem through the resource augmentation framework in scenarios when the values of the rewards are correlated. Our goal is to determine the number of additional rewards an online algorithm requires to approximate the maximum value of the original instance. While the independent reward case is well understood, we extend this research to account for correlations among rewards. Our results demonstrate that, unlike in the independent case, the required number of additional rewards for approximation depends on the number of original rewards, and that block-threshold algorithms, which are optimal in the independent case, may require an infinite number of additional rewards when correlations are present. We develop asymptotically optimal algorithms for the following three scenarios: (1) where rewards arrive in blocks corresponding to the different copies of the original instance; (2) where rewards across all copies are arbitrarily shuffled; and (3) where rewards arrive in blocks corresponding to the different copies of the original instance, and values within each block are pairwise independent rather than fully correlated.