Abstract:In this paper, we present a deepfake detection algorithm specifically designed for electronic Know Your Customer (eKYC) systems. To ensure the reliability of eKYC systems against deepfake attacks, it is essential to develop a robust deepfake detector capable of identifying both face swapping and face reenactment, while also being robust to image degradation. We address these challenges through three key contributions: (1)~Our approach evaluates the video's authenticity by detecting temporal inconsistencies in identity vectors extracted by face recognition models, leading to comprehensive detection of both face swapping and face reenactment. (2)~In addition to processing video input, the algorithm utilizes a registered image (assumed to be genuine) to calculate identity discrepancies between the input video and the registered image, significantly improving detection accuracy. (3)~We find that employing a face feature extractor trained on a larger dataset enhances both detection performance and robustness against image degradation. Our experimental results show that our proposed method accurately detects both face swapping and face reenactment comprehensively and is robust against various forms of unseen image degradation. Our source code is publicly available https://github.com/TaikiMiyagawa/DeepfakeDetection4eKYC.
Abstract:We assess the vulnerabilities of deep face recognition systems for images that falsify/spoof multiple identities simultaneously. We demonstrate that, by manipulating the deep feature representation extracted from a face image via imperceptibly small perturbations added at the pixel level using our proposed Universal Adversarial Spoofing Examples (UAXs), one can fool a face verification system into recognizing that the face image belongs to multiple different identities with a high success rate. One characteristic of the UAXs crafted with our method is that they are universal (identity-agnostic); they are successful even against identities not known in advance. For a certain deep neural network, we show that we are able to spoof almost all tested identities (99\%), including those not known beforehand (not included in training). Our results indicate that a multiple-identity attack is a real threat and should be taken into account when deploying face recognition systems.