What Counts as AI Sycophancy? A Taxonomy and Expert Survey of a Fragmented Construct

AI sycophancy has become a prominent concern in large language model (LLM) research. Yet the term lacks a consistent definition and has been applied to behaviors ranging from agreeing with a user's false claim to excessively praising the user to withholding corrective feedback. When researchers, companies, and policymakers use the same term to describe different behaviors, evaluation results become difficult to compare, mitigation strategies fail to transfer, and systems that are resistant to one form of sycophancy continue exhibiting other forms. To address this, we make two contributions. First, we reviewed 70 papers on AI sycophancy to develop a taxonomy of how the behavior has been defined and measured. The taxonomy distinguishes (1) whether a model is sycophantic toward a user's positions and beliefs, or toward the user's broader personal traits and emotions, and (2) whether this occurs through explicit, direct language or more implicit, subtle behaviors such as framing, omission, or tone. Mapping existing literature to our taxonomy reveals that current research has focused on overt forms of sycophancy toward users' beliefs, leaving more subtle and person-directed behaviors relatively understudied. Second, we surveyed 106 experts in AI sycophancy and related fields to examine whether researchers agree on which model behaviors are sycophantic. While experts are nearly unanimous in believing that sycophancy is a significant problem in current AI systems (94.3% agree), they disagree substantially on which specific behaviors qualify. Together, these findings demonstrate that AI sycophancy is a broad family of behaviors with different measurement challenges, intervention requirements, and governance implications. Our taxonomy provides a shared vocabulary for understanding and addressing these behaviors.

Generative Language Models Exhibit Social Identity Biases

The surge in popularity of large language models has given rise to concerns about biases that these models could learn from humans. In this study, we investigate whether ingroup solidarity and outgroup hostility, fundamental social biases known from social science, are present in 51 large language models. We find that almost all foundational language models and some instruction fine-tuned models exhibit clear ingroup-positive and outgroup-negative biases when prompted to complete sentences (e.g., "We are..."). A comparison of LLM-generated sentences with human-written sentences on the internet reveals that these models exhibit similar level, if not greater, levels of bias than human text. To investigate where these biases stem from, we experimentally varied the amount of ingroup-positive or outgroup-negative sentences the model was exposed to during fine-tuning in the context of the United States Democrat-Republican divide. Doing so resulted in the models exhibiting a marked increase in ingroup solidarity and an even greater increase in outgroup hostility. Furthermore, removing either ingroup-positive or outgroup-negative sentences (or both) from the fine-tuning data leads to a significant reduction in both ingroup solidarity and outgroup hostility, suggesting that biases can be reduced by removing biased training data. Our findings suggest that modern language models exhibit fundamental social identity biases and that such biases can be mitigated by curating training data. Our results have practical implications for creating less biased large-language models and further underscore the need for more research into user interactions with LLMs to prevent potential bias reinforcement in humans.