On the Robustness of Watermarking for Autoregressive Image Generation

The proliferation of autoregressive (AR) image generators demands reliable detection and attribution of their outputs to mitigate misinformation, and to filter synthetic images from training data to prevent model collapse. To address this need, watermarking techniques, specifically designed for AR models, embed a subtle signal at generation time, enabling downstream verification through a corresponding watermark detector. In this work, we study these schemes and demonstrate their vulnerability to both watermark removal and forgery attacks. We assess existing attacks and further introduce three new attacks: (i) a vector-quantized regeneration removal attack, (ii) adversarial optimization-based attack, and (iii) a frequency injection attack. Our evaluation reveals that removal and forgery attacks can be effective with access to a single watermarked reference image and without access to original model parameters or watermarking secrets. Our findings indicate that existing watermarking schemes for AR image generation do not reliably support synthetic content detection for dataset filtering. Moreover, they enable Watermark Mimicry, whereby authentic images can be manipulated to imitate a generator's watermark and trigger false detection to prevent their inclusion in future model training.

Understanding Empirical Unlearning with Combinatorial Interpretability

While many recent methods aim to unlearn or remove knowledge from pretrained models, seemingly erased knowledge often persists and can be recovered in various ways. Because large foundation models are far from interpretable, understanding whether and how such knowledge persists remains a significant challenge. To address this, we turn to the recently developed framework of combinatorial interpretability. This framework, designed for two-layer neural networks, enables direct inspection of the knowledge encoded in the model weights. We reproduce baseline unlearning methods within the combinatorial interpretability setting and examine their behavior along two dimensions: (i) whether they truly remove knowledge of a target concept (the concept we wish to remove) or merely inhibit its expression while retaining the underlying information, and (ii) how easily the supposedly erased knowledge can be recovered through various fine-tuning operations. Our results shed light within a fully interpretable setting on how knowledge can persist despite unlearning and when it might resurface.