An Evaluation of Data Leakage Risks in Tool-Using LLM Agents in Realistic Scenarios

AI agents are increasingly being adopted in enterprise and personal settings with access to emails, databases, documents, and other tools where they can read, update, and disseminate sensitive information. Much of prior research on data leakage risks in agents has focused on adversarial data exfiltration through prompt injections and jailbreaks. However, sensitive information may also be exposed during non-adversarial use, creating leakage risks even when users issue benign requests. We report a joint evaluation by the Singapore AI Safety Institute and the Korea AI Safety Institute examining agent data leakage in 12 realistic, non-adversarial tasks spanning customer support, DevOps, web automation, and enterprise and personal productivity. The evaluation covers five risk types: lack of data awareness, audience awareness, policy compliance, data minimization, and access-boundary awareness. Both institutes tested a common set of scenarios mirroring real-world deployments using independent testing environments and task-specific LLM-judge rubrics. Across the three tested agents, none achieved fully correct and fully safe execution across all scenarios. Successful task completion often coincided with data-handling failures such as accessing unnecessary information or disclosing information to inappropriate recipients, indicating that capability and data-handling safety should be evaluated separately. Qualitative review also revealed claim-action mismatches, simulation-aware behavior, user-simulator role reversal, and interpretation gaps in automated judging. Overall, the results indicate that operational data leakage is a first-order agent-safety concern distinct from adversarial exfiltration and provide a methodology for future evaluations of agent data-handling safety.

XL-SafetyBench: A Country-Grounded Cross-Cultural Benchmark for LLM Safety and Cultural Sensitivity

Current LLM safety benchmarks are predominantly English-centric and often rely on translation, failing to capture country-specific harms. Moreover, they rarely evaluate a model's ability to detect culturally embedded sensitivities as distinct from universal harms. We introduce XL-SafetyBench. a suite of 5,500 test cases across 10 country-language pairs, comprising a Jailbreak Benchmark of country-grounded adversarial prompts and a Cultural Benchmark where local sensitivities are embedded within innocuous requests. Each item is constructed via a multi-stage pipeline that combines LLM-assisted discovery, automated validation gates, and dual independent native-speaker annotators per country. To distinguish principled refusal from comprehension failure, we evaluate Attack Success Rate (ASR) alongside two complementary metrics we introduce: Neutral-Safe Rate (NSR) and Cultural Sensitivity Rate (CSR). Evaluating 10 frontier and 27 local LLMs reveals two key findings. First, jailbreak robustness and cultural awareness do not show a coupled relationship among frontier models, so a composite safety score obscures per-axis variation. Second, local models exhibit a near-linear ASR-NSR trade-off (r = -0.81), indicating that their apparent safety reflects generation failure rather than genuine alignment. XL-SafetyBench enables more nuanced, cross-cultural safety evaluation in the multilingual era.

Improving Methodologies for LLM Evaluations Across Global Languages

As frontier AI models are deployed globally, it is essential that their behaviour remains safe and reliable across diverse linguistic and cultural contexts. To examine how current model safeguards hold up in such settings, participants from the International Network for Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation and Science, including representatives from Singapore, Japan, Australia, Canada, the EU, France, Kenya, South Korea and the UK conducted a joint multilingual evaluation exercise. Led by Singapore AISI, two open-weight models were tested across ten languages spanning high and low resourced groups: Cantonese English, Farsi, French, Japanese, Korean, Kiswahili, Malay, Mandarin Chinese and Telugu. Over 6,000 newly translated prompts were evaluated across five harm categories (privacy, non-violent crime, violent crime, intellectual property and jailbreak robustness), using both LLM-as-a-judge and human annotation. The exercise shows how safety behaviours can vary across languages. These include differences in safeguard robustness across languages and harm types and variation in evaluator reliability (LLM-as-judge vs. human review). Further, it also generated methodological insights for improving multilingual safety evaluations, such as the need for culturally contextualised translations, stress-tested evaluator prompts and clearer human annotation guidelines. This work represents an initial step toward a shared framework for multilingual safety testing of advanced AI systems and calls for continued collaboration with the wider research community and industry.

Improving Methodologies for Agentic Evaluations Across Domains: Leakage of Sensitive Information, Fraud and Cybersecurity Threats

The rapid rise of autonomous AI systems and advancements in agent capabilities are introducing new risks due to reduced oversight of real-world interactions. Yet agent testing remains nascent and is still a developing science. As AI agents begin to be deployed globally, it is important that they handle different languages and cultures accurately and securely. To address this, participants from The International Network for Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation and Science, including representatives from Singapore, Japan, Australia, Canada, the European Commission, France, Kenya, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have come together to align approaches to agentic evaluations. This is the third exercise, building on insights from two earlier joint testing exercises conducted by the Network in November 2024 and February 2025. The objective is to further refine best practices for testing advanced AI systems. The exercise was split into two strands: (1) common risks, including leakage of sensitive information and fraud, led by Singapore AISI; and (2) cybersecurity, led by UK AISI. A mix of open and closed-weight models were evaluated against tasks from various public agentic benchmarks. Given the nascency of agentic testing, our primary focus was on understanding methodological issues in conducting such tests, rather than examining test results or model capabilities. This collaboration marks an important step forward as participants work together to advance the science of agentic evaluations.