No More, No Less: Task Alignment in Terminal Agents

Terminal agents are increasingly capable of executing complex, long-horizon tasks autonomously from a single user prompt. To do so, they must interpret instructions encountered in the environment (e.g., README files, code comments, stack traces) and determine their relevance to the task. This creates a fundamental challenge: relevant cues must be followed to complete a task, whereas irrelevant or misleading ones must be ignored. Existing benchmarks do not capture this ability. An agent may appear capable by blindly following all instructions, or appear robust by ignoring them altogether. We introduce TAB (Task Alignment Benchmark), a suite of 89 terminal tasks derived from Terminal-Bench 2.1. Each task is intentionally underspecified, with missing information provided as a necessary cue embedded in a natural environmental artifact, alongside a plausible but irrelevant distractor. Solving these tasks requires selectively using the cue while ignoring the distractor. Applying TAB to ten frontier agents reveals a systematic gap between task capability and task alignment. The strongest Terminal-Bench agent achieves high task completion but low task alignment on TAB. Evaluating six prompt-injection defenses further shows that suppressing distractor execution also suppresses the cues required for task completion. These results demonstrate that task-aligned agents require selective use of environmental instructions rather than blanket acceptance or rejection.

Don't Trust Stubborn Neighbors: A Security Framework for Agentic Networks

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) are increasingly deployed for agentic tasks, such as web automation, itinerary planning, and collaborative problem solving. Yet, their interactive nature introduces new security risks: malicious or compromised agents can exploit communication channels to propagate misinformation and manipulate collective outcomes. In this paper, we study how such manipulation can arise and spread by borrowing the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion formation model from social sciences to propose a general theoretical framework to study LLM-MAS. Remarkably, this model closely captures LLM-MAS behavior, as we verify in extensive experiments across different network topologies and attack and defense scenarios. Theoretically and empirically, we find that a single highly stubborn and persuasive agent can take over MAS dynamics, underscoring the systems' high susceptibility to attacks by triggering a persuasion cascade that reshapes collective opinion. Our theoretical analysis reveals three mechanisms to increase system security: a) increasing the number of benign agents, b) increasing the innate stubbornness or peer-resistance of agents, or c) reducing trust in potential adversaries. Because scaling is computationally expensive and high stubbornness degrades the network's ability to reach consensus, we propose a new mechanism to mitigate threats by a trust-adaptive defense that dynamically adjusts inter-agent trust to limit adversarial influence while maintaining cooperative performance. Extensive experiments confirm that this mechanism effectively defends against manipulation.