LEGO: An LLM Skill-Based Front-End Design Generation Platform

Existing LLM-based EDA agents are often isolated task-specific systems. This leads to repeated engineering effort and limited reuse of successful design and debugging strategies. We present LEGO, a unified skill-based platform for front-end design generation. It decomposes the digital front-end flow into six independent steps and represents every agent capability as a standardized composable circuit skill within a plug-and-play architecture. To build this skill library, we survey more than 100 papers, select 11 representative open-source projects, and extract 42 executable circuit skills within a six-step finite state machine formulation. Circuit Skill Builder automates skill extraction with linear scalability. Agent Skill RAG achieves submillisecond retrieval without relying on embedding models. Empirical evaluation on a hard subset of 41 VerilogEval v2 problems that gpt-5.2-codex fails to solve under extra-high reasoning effort shows that individual circuit skills constructed within LEGO raise Pass@1 from 0.000 to 0.805. This is an 80.5% gain over the baseline. Cross-project skill compositions also reach 0.805 Pass@1. They outperform hierarchy-verilog by 14.6% and VerilogCoder by 2.5%. They also match MAGE. These results show that modular skill composition supports both effective and flexible RTL design automation. The LEGO platform and all circuit skills are publicly available at GitHub: https://github.com/loujc/LEGO-An-LLM-Skill-Based-Front-End-Design-Generation-Platform

WAInjectBench: Benchmarking Prompt Injection Detections for Web Agents

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.