Assessing the Effectiveness of Syntactic Structure to Learn Code Edit Representations

In recent times, it has been shown that one can use code as data to aid various applications such as automatic commit message generation, automatic generation of pull request descriptions and automatic program repair. Take for instance the problem of commit message generation. Treating source code as a sequence of tokens, state of the art techniques generate commit messages using neural machine translation models. However, they tend to ignore the syntactic structure of programming languages. Previous work, i.e., code2seq has used structural information from Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) to represent source code and they use it to automatically generate method names. In this paper, we elaborate upon this state of the art approach and modify it to represent source code edits. We determine the effect of using such syntactic structure for the problem of classifying code edits. Inspired by the code2seq approach, we evaluate how using structural information from AST, i.e., paths between AST leaf nodes can help with the task of code edit classification on two datasets of fine-grained syntactic edits. Our experiments shows that attempts of adding syntactic structure does not result in any improvements over less sophisticated methods. The results suggest that techniques such as code2seq, while promising, have a long way to go before they can be generically applied to learning code edit representations. We hope that these results will benefit other researchers and inspire them to work further on this problem.

Privado: Practical and Secure DNN Inference

Recently, cloud providers have extended support for trusted hardware primitives such as Intel SGX. Simultaneously, the field of deep learning is seeing enormous innovation and increase in adoption. In this paper, we therefore ask the question: "Can third-party cloud services use SGX to provide practical, yet secure DNN Inference-as-a-service? " Our work addresses the three main challenges that SGX-based DNN inferencing faces, namely, security, ease-of-use, and performance. We first demonstrate that side-channel based attacks on DNN models are indeed possible. We show that, by observing access patterns, we can recover inputs to the DNN model. This motivates the need for Privado, a system we have designed for secure inference-as-a-service. Privado is input-oblivious: it transforms any deep learning framework written in C/C++ to be free of input-dependent access patterns. Privado is fully-automated and has a low TCB: with zero developer effort, given an ONNX description, it generates compact C code for the model which can run within SGX-enclaves. Privado has low performance overhead: we have used Privado with Torch, and have shown its overhead to be 20.77\% on average on 10 contemporary networks.