Learning Dynamics of Strategic Publishers in Generative AI Ecosystems

Generative AI (GenAI) search systems are transforming how users access information. Unlike ranking-based search systems, where users observe a ranked list of documents, GenAI search systems, given a user's question, generate an answer, often accompanied by external sources (e.g., in the form of citations). Content creators (publishers) seeking to increase exposure might behave strategically and compete with other creators for users' attention. While publishers in ranking-based systems might strategically modify their content to improve its ranking, the incentives in generative systems take on a new form. Publishers may now gain exposure through generated responses and attributions to those responses. We introduce a novel game-theoretic model of the emerging GenAI ecosystem in which publishers compete for attribution-based exposure. We study the learning dynamics of strategic content creators under better-response dynamics. We associate the convergence of learning dynamics to equilibrium with ecosystem stability. Employing the notion of potential games, we study the stability of GenAI ecosystems under several known content selection mechanisms. We demonstrate the instability of mechanisms representing real-world modern systems and characterize a mechanism that induces a stable ecosystem. We conduct extensive simulations to analyze the stability and welfare of GenAI ecosystems under various mechanisms. The simulations support our theoretical findings and reveal an interplay among stability, publisher welfare, and user welfare. In particular, stable mechanisms do not necessarily maximize welfare, demonstrating an important trade-off for platform designers. We then introduce a study illustrating that the proper selection of the GenAI mechanism enables the manifestation of desired trade-offs between publisher welfare and the different sources of user welfare.

Stability in Competitive Search with Results Diversification

In a competitive search setting, publishers strategically modify their documents in response to induced rankings so as to improve their future ranking. We present a novel game-theoretic analysis of a competitive search setting where search-results diversification is applied. Our analysis reveals an inherent tradeoff between corpus diversity and corpus stability, where the latter corresponds to an equilibrium in a game. We analyze two representative diversification methods and show that stability need not necessarily be reached, leaving the corpus to rapid changes due to ranking incentivized modifications of publishers. We then present a novel approach to devise diversification-based ranking functions that are guaranteed to lead to corpus stability.

Data Sharing with a Generative AI Competitor

As GenAI platforms grow, their dependence on content from competing providers, combined with access to alternative data sources, creates new challenges for data-sharing decisions. In this paper, we provide a model of data sharing between a content creation firm and a GenAI platform that can also acquire content from third-party experts. The interaction is modeled as a Stackelberg game: the firm first decides how much of its proprietary dataset to share with GenAI, and GenAI subsequently determines how much additional data to acquire from external experts. Their utilities depend on user traffic, monetary transfers, and the cost of acquiring additional data from external experts. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and uncover a surprising phenomenon: The firm may be willing to pay GenAI to share the firm's own data, leading to a costly data-sharing equilibrium. We further characterize the set of Pareto improving data prices, and show that such improvements occur only when the firm pays to share data. Finally, we study how the price can be set to optimize different design objectives, such as promoting firm data sharing, expert data acquisition, or a balance of both. Our results shed light on the economic forces shaping data-sharing partnerships in the age of GenAI, and provide guidance for platforms, regulators and policymakers seeking to design effective data exchange mechanisms.

GLEE: A Unified Framework and Benchmark for Language-based Economic Environments

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Can Large Language Models Replace Economic Choice Prediction Labs?

Economic choice prediction is an essential challenging task, often constrained by the difficulties in acquiring human choice data. Indeed, experimental economics studies had focused mostly on simple choice settings. The AI community has recently contributed to that effort in two ways: considering whether LLMs can substitute for humans in the above-mentioned simple choice prediction settings, and the study through ML lens of more elaborated but still rigorous experimental economics settings, employing incomplete information, repetitive play, and natural language communication, notably language-based persuasion games. This leaves us with a major inspiration: can LLMs be used to fully simulate the economic environment and generate data for efficient human choice prediction, substituting for the elaborated economic lab studies? We pioneer the study of this subject, demonstrating its feasibility. In particular, we show that a model trained solely on LLM-generated data can effectively predict human behavior in a language-based persuasion game, and can even outperform models trained on actual human data.

The Search for Stability: Learning Dynamics of Strategic Publishers with Initial Documents

We study a game-theoretic model of information retrieval, in which strategic publishers aim to maximize their chances of being ranked first by the search engine, while maintaining the integrity of their original documents. We show that the commonly used PRP ranking scheme results in an unstable environment where games often fail to reach pure Nash equilibrium. We propose the Relative Ranking Principle (RRP) as an alternative ranking principle, and introduce two ranking functions that are instances of the RRP. We provide both theoretical and empirical evidence that these methods lead to a stable search ecosystem, by providing positive results on the learning dynamics convergence. We also define the publishers' and users' welfare, and demonstrate a possible publisher-user trade-off, which highlights the complexity of determining which ranking function should be selected by the search engine designer.