Stability in Competitive Search with Results Diversification

In a competitive search setting, publishers strategically modify their documents in response to induced rankings so as to improve their future ranking. We present a novel game-theoretic analysis of a competitive search setting where search-results diversification is applied. Our analysis reveals an inherent tradeoff between corpus diversity and corpus stability, where the latter corresponds to an equilibrium in a game. We analyze two representative diversification methods and show that stability need not necessarily be reached, leaving the corpus to rapid changes due to ranking incentivized modifications of publishers. We then present a novel approach to devise diversification-based ranking functions that are guaranteed to lead to corpus stability.

Search results diversification in competitive search

In Web retrieval, there are many cases of competition between authors of Web documents: their incentive is to have their documents highly ranked for queries of interest. As such, the Web is a prominent example of a competitive search setting. Past work on competitive search focused on ranking functions based solely on relevance estimation. We study ranking functions that integrate a results-diversification aspect. We show that the competitive search setting with diversity-based ranking has an equilibrium. Furthermore, we theoretically and empirically show that the phenomenon of authors mimicking content in documents highly ranked in the past, which was demonstrated in previous work, is mitigated when search results diversification is applied.

GLEE: A Unified Framework and Benchmark for Language-based Economic Environments

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.