Abstract:We propose that AI automation is a continuum between: (i) crashing waves where AI capabilities surge abruptly over small sets of tasks, and (ii) rising tides where the increase in AI capabilities is more continuous and broad-based. We test for these effects in preliminary evidence from an ongoing evaluation of AI capabilities across over 3,000 broad-based tasks derived from the U.S. Department of Labor O*NET categorization that are text-based and thus LLM-addressable. Based on more than 17,000 evaluations by workers from these jobs, we find little evidence of crashing waves (in contrast to recent work by METR), but substantial evidence that rising tides are the primary form of AI automation. AI performance is high and improving rapidly across a wide range of tasks. We estimate that, in 2024-Q2, AI models successfully complete tasks that take humans approximately 3-4 hours with about a 50% success rate, increasing to about 65% by 2025-Q3. If recent trends in AI capability growth persist, this pace of AI improvement implies that LLMs will be able to complete most text-related tasks with success rates of, on average, 80%-95% by 2029 at a minimally sufficient quality level. Achieving near-perfect success rates at this quality level or comparable success rates at superior quality would require several additional years. These AI capability improvements would impact the economy and labor market as organizations adopt AI, which could have a substantially longer timeline.
Abstract:Do leading LLM developers possess a proprietary ``secret sauce'', or is LLM performance driven by scaling up compute? Using training and benchmark data for 809 models released between 2022 and 2025, we estimate scaling-law regressions with release-date and developer fixed effects. We find clear evidence of developer-specific efficiency advantages, but their importance depends on where models lie in the performance distribution. At the frontier, 80-90% of performance differences are explained by higher training compute, implying that scale--not proprietary technology--drives frontier advances. Away from the frontier, however, proprietary techniques and shared algorithmic progress substantially reduce the compute required to reach fixed capability thresholds. Some companies can systematically produce smaller models more efficiently. Strikingly, we also find substantial variation of model efficiency within companies; a firm can train two models with more than 40x compute efficiency difference. We also discuss the implications for AI leadership and capability diffusion.