Today, participating in discussions on online forums is extremely commonplace and these discussions have started rendering a strong influence on the overall opinion of online users. Naturally, twisting the flow of the argument can have a strong impact on the minds of naive users, which in the long run might have socio-political ramifications, for example, winning an election or spreading targeted misinformation. Thus, these platforms are potentially highly vulnerable to malicious players who might act individually or as a cohort to breed fallacious arguments with a motive to sway public opinion. Ad hominem arguments are one of the most effective forms of such fallacies. Although a simple fallacy, it is effective enough to sway public debates in offline world and can be used as a precursor to shutting down the voice of opposition by slander. In this work, we take a first step in shedding light on the usage of ad hominem fallacies in the wild. First, we build a powerful ad hominem detector with high accuracy (F1 more than 83%, showing a significant improvement over prior work), even for datasets for which annotated instances constitute a very small fraction. We then used our detector on 265k arguments collected from the online debate forum - CreateDebate. Our crowdsourced surveys validate our in-the-wild predictions on CreateDebate data (94% match with manual annotation). Our analysis revealed that a surprising 31.23% of CreateDebate content contains ad hominem fallacy, and a cohort of highly active users post significantly more ad hominem to suppress opposing views. Then, our temporal analysis revealed that ad hominem argument usage increased significantly since the 2016 US Presidential election, not only for topics like Politics, but also for Science and Law. We conclude by discussing important implications of our work to detect and defend against ad hominem fallacies.
Over-sharing poorly-worded thoughts and personal information is prevalent on online social platforms. In many of these cases, users regret posting such content. To retrospectively rectify these errors in users' sharing decisions, most platforms offer (deletion) mechanisms to withdraw the content, and social media users often utilize them. Ironically and perhaps unfortunately, these deletions make users more susceptible to privacy violations by malicious actors who specifically hunt post deletions at large scale. The reason for such hunting is simple: deleting a post acts as a powerful signal that the post might be damaging to its owner. Today, multiple archival services are already scanning social media for these deleted posts. Moreover, as we demonstrate in this work, powerful machine learning models can detect damaging deletions at scale. Towards restraining such a global adversary against users' right to be forgotten, we introduce Deceptive Deletion, a decoy mechanism that minimizes the adversarial advantage. Our mechanism injects decoy deletions, hence creating a two-player minmax game between an adversary that seeks to classify damaging content among the deleted posts and a challenger that employs decoy deletions to masquerade real damaging deletions. We formalize the Deceptive Game between the two players, determine conditions under which either the adversary or the challenger provably wins the game, and discuss the scenarios in-between these two extremes. We apply the Deceptive Deletion mechanism to a real-world task on Twitter: hiding damaging tweet deletions. We show that a powerful global adversary can be beaten by a powerful challenger, raising the bar significantly and giving a glimmer of hope in the ability to be really forgotten on social platforms.