Perception Visualization: Seeing Through the Eyes of a DNN

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems power the world we live in. Deep neural networks (DNNs) are able to solve tasks in an ever-expanding landscape of scenarios, but our eagerness to apply these powerful models leads us to focus on their performance and deprioritises our ability to understand them. Current research in the field of explainable AI tries to bridge this gap by developing various perturbation or gradient-based explanation techniques. For images, these techniques fail to fully capture and convey the semantic information needed to elucidate why the model makes the predictions it does. In this work, we develop a new form of explanation that is radically different in nature from current explanation methods, such as Grad-CAM. Perception visualization provides a visual representation of what the DNN perceives in the input image by depicting what visual patterns the latent representation corresponds to. Visualizations are obtained through a reconstruction model that inverts the encoded features, such that the parameters and predictions of the original models are not modified. Results of our user study demonstrate that humans can better understand and predict the system's decisions when perception visualizations are available, thus easing the debugging and deployment of deep models as trusted systems.

Adversarial Scratches: Deployable Attacks to CNN Classifiers

A growing body of work has shown that deep neural networks are susceptible to adversarial examples. These take the form of small perturbations applied to the model's input which lead to incorrect predictions. Unfortunately, most literature focuses on visually imperceivable perturbations to be applied to digital images that often are, by design, impossible to be deployed to physical targets. We present Adversarial Scratches: a novel L0 black-box attack, which takes the form of scratches in images, and which possesses much greater deployability than other state-of-the-art attacks. Adversarial Scratches leverage B\'ezier Curves to reduce the dimension of the search space and possibly constrain the attack to a specific location. We test Adversarial Scratches in several scenarios, including a publicly available API and images of traffic signs. Results show that, often, our attack achieves higher fooling rate than other deployable state-of-the-art methods, while requiring significantly fewer queries and modifying very few pixels.