Policy Optimization and Statistical Inference for Online Contextual Matrix Games

Online decision making often requires navigating a landscape shaped by both dynamic contexts and strategic interactions. In competitive pricing, for example, hotels must account for both dynamic contextual factors and rivals' strategic responses. Existing approaches address only part of this challenge: contextual bandits optimize single-agent decisions using observable features but ignore multi-player interactions, while online matrix games capture strategic behavior through Nash equilibrium but assume fixed payoffs, ignoring contextual information. How should agents act then when strategic payoffs evolve with contextual signals? We introduce \emph{online contextual matrix games} to integrate contextual information into multi-player online games. We further propose \emph{OnGameLearn}, an online learning algorithm that efficiently balances exploration and exploitation across both player actions and contexts. This approach comes with statistical guarantees: tail bounds for the estimated payoff matrix, the convergence of the estimated Nash equilibrium, the asymptotic normality of the parameter estimators, and the sublinear regret bound. We also develop the notion of \emph{policy value} in matrix games and develop a doubly robust, $\sqrt{T}$-consistent estimator for it. Across simulated studies and a real-world hotel pricing application, we find that OnGameLearn effectively navigates the intertwined challenges of strategic and contextual decision-making.

Reasoning Is Not Free: Robust Adaptive Cost-Efficient Routing for LLM-as-a-Judge

Reasoning-capable large language models (LLMs) have recently been adopted as automated judges, but their benefits and costs in LLM-as-a-Judge settings remain unclear. Through controlled comparisons between reasoning and non-reasoning judges, we show that explicit reasoning substantially improves judgment accuracy on tasks requiring structured verification (e.g., math and coding), while offering limited or even negative gains on simpler evaluations and incurring significantly higher computational cost. These findings motivate that reasoning should be used selectively rather than universally, with awareness of possible distribution shift. We propose a Robust Adaptive Cost-Efficient Routing (RACER), which dynamically selects between reasoning and non-reasoning judges under a fixed budget by formulating routing as a constrained distributionally robust optimization problem. RACER explicitly accounts for distribution shift via a KL-divergence uncertainty set, admits an efficient primal--dual algorithm, and enjoys theoretical guarantees including uniqueness of the optimal policy and linear convergence. Extensive experiments show that RACER achieves superior accuracy--cost trade-offs under distribution shift.