Strategic Learning with Local Explanations as Feedback

We investigate algorithmic decision problems where agents can respond strategically to the decision maker's (DM) models. The demand for clear and actionable explanations from DMs to (potentially strategic) agents continues to rise. While prior work often treats explanations as full model disclosures, explanations in practice might convey only partial information, which can lead to misinterpretations and harmful responses. When full disclosure of the predictive model is neither feasible nor desirable, a key open question is how DMs can use explanations to maximise their utility without compromising agent welfare. In this work, we explore well-known local and global explanation methods, and establish a necessary condition to prevent explanations from misleading agents into self-harming actions. Moreover, with conditional homogeneity, we establish that action recommendation (AR)-based explanations are sufficient for non-harmful responses, akin to the revelation principle in information design. To operationalise AR-based explanations, we propose a simple algorithm to jointly optimise the predictive model and AR policy to balance DM outcomes with agent welfare. Our empirical results demonstrate the benefits of this approach as a more refined strategy for safe and effective partial model disclosure in algorithmic decision-making.

Causal Strategic Learning with Competitive Selection

We study the problem of agent selection in causal strategic learning under multiple decision makers and address two key challenges that come with it. Firstly, while much of prior work focuses on studying a fixed pool of agents that remains static regardless of their evaluations, we consider the impact of selection procedure by which agents are not only evaluated, but also selected. When each decision maker unilaterally selects agents by maximising their own utility, we show that the optimal selection rule is a trade-off between selecting the best agents and providing incentives to maximise the agents' improvement. Furthermore, this optimal selection rule relies on incorrect predictions of agents' outcomes. Hence, we study the conditions under which a decision maker's optimal selection rule will not lead to deterioration of agents' outcome nor cause unjust reduction in agents' selection chance. To that end, we provide an analytical form of the optimal selection rule and a mechanism to retrieve the causal parameters from observational data, under certain assumptions on agents' behaviour. Secondly, when there are multiple decision makers, the interference between selection rules introduces another source of biases in estimating the underlying causal parameters. To address this problem, we provide a cooperative protocol which all decision makers must collectively adopt to recover the true causal parameters. Lastly, we complement our theoretical results with simulation studies. Our results highlight not only the importance of causal modeling as a strategy to mitigate the effect of gaming, as suggested by previous work, but also the need of a benevolent regulator to enable it.