Discretion in the Loop: Human Expertise in Algorithm-Assisted College Advising

In higher education, many institutions use algorithmic alerts to flag at-risk students and deliver advising at scale. While much research has focused on evaluating algorithmic predictions, relatively little is known about how discretionary interventions by human experts shape outcomes in algorithm-assisted settings. We study this question using rich quantitative and qualitative data from a randomized controlled trial of an algorithm-assisted advising program at Georgia State University. Taking a mixed-methods approach, we examine whether and how advisors use context unavailable to an algorithm to guide interventions and influence student success. We develop a causal graphical framework for human expertise in the interventional setting, extending prior work on discretion in purely predictive settings. We then test a necessary condition for discretionary expertise using structured advisor logs and student outcomes data, identifying several interventions that meet the criterion for statistical significance. Accordingly, we estimate that 2 out of 3 interventions taken by advisors in the treatment arm were plausibly "expertly targeted" to students using non-algorithmic context. Systematic qualitative analysis of advisor notes corroborates these findings, showing that advisors incorporate diverse forms of contextual information--such as personal circumstances, financial issues, and student engagement--into their decisions. Finally, we explore the broader implications of human discretion for long-term outcomes and equity, using heterogeneous treatment effect estimation. Our results offer theoretical and practical insight into the real-world effectiveness of algorithm-supported college advising, and underscore the importance of accounting for human expertise in the design, evaluation, and implementation of algorithmic decision systems.

Modeling Discrimination with Causal Abstraction

A person is directly racially discriminated against only if her race caused her worse treatment. This implies that race is an attribute sufficiently separable from other attributes to isolate its causal role. But race is embedded in a nexus of social factors that resist isolated treatment. If race is socially constructed, in what sense can it cause worse treatment? Some propose that the perception of race, rather than race itself, causes worse treatment. Others suggest that since causal models require modularity, i.e. the ability to isolate causal effects, attempts to causally model discrimination are misguided. This paper addresses the problem differently. We introduce a framework for reasoning about discrimination, in which race is a high-level abstraction of lower-level features. In this framework, race can be modeled as itself causing worse treatment. Modularity is ensured by allowing assumptions about social construction to be precisely and explicitly stated, via an alignment between race and its constituents. Such assumptions can then be subjected to normative and empirical challenges, which lead to different views of when discrimination occurs. By distinguishing constitutive and causal relations, the abstraction framework pinpoints disagreements in the current literature on modeling discrimination, while preserving a precise causal account of discrimination.