T-PRIME: Transformer-based Protocol Identification for Machine-learning at the Edge

Spectrum sharing allows different protocols of the same standard (e.g., 802.11 family) or different standards (e.g., LTE and DVB) to coexist in overlapping frequency bands. As this paradigm continues to spread, wireless systems must also evolve to identify active transmitters and unauthorized waveforms in real time under intentional distortion of preambles, extremely low signal-to-noise ratios and challenging channel conditions. We overcome limitations of correlation-based preamble matching methods in such conditions through the design of T-PRIME: a Transformer-based machine learning approach. T-PRIME learns the structural design of transmitted frames through its attention mechanism, looking at sequence patterns that go beyond the preamble alone. The paper makes three contributions: First, it compares Transformer models and demonstrates their superiority over traditional methods and state-of-the-art neural networks. Second, it rigorously analyzes T-PRIME's real-time feasibility on DeepWave's AIR-T platform. Third, it utilizes an extensive 66 GB dataset of over-the-air (OTA) WiFi transmissions for training, which is released along with the code for community use. Results reveal nearly perfect (i.e. $>98\%$) classification accuracy under simulated scenarios, showing $100\%$ detection improvement over legacy methods in low SNR ranges, $97\%$ classification accuracy for OTA single-protocol transmissions and up to $75\%$ double-protocol classification accuracy in interference scenarios.

Implementing and Evaluating Security in O-RAN: Interfaces, Intelligence, and Platforms

The Open Radio Access Network (RAN) is a networking paradigm that builds on top of cloud-based, multi-vendor, open and intelligent architectures to shape the next generation of cellular networks for 5G and beyond. While this new paradigm comes with many advantages in terms of observatibility and reconfigurability of the network, it inevitably expands the threat surface of cellular systems and can potentially expose its components to several cyber attacks, thus making securing O-RAN networks a necessity. In this paper, we explore the security aspects of O-RAN systems by focusing on the specifications and architectures proposed by the O-RAN Alliance. We address the problem of securing O-RAN systems with an holistic perspective, including considerations on the open interfaces used to interconnect the different O-RAN components, on the overall platform, and on the intelligence used to monitor and control the network. For each focus area we identify threats, discuss relevant solutions to address these issues, and demonstrate experimentally how such solutions can effectively defend O-RAN systems against selected cyber attacks. This article is the first work in approaching the security aspect of O-RAN holistically and with experimental evidence obtained on a state-of-the-art programmable O-RAN platform, thus providing unique guideline for researchers in the field.