Abstract:Generative distillation significantly accelerates text-to-image (T2I) generation by compressing multi-step trajectories into few-step student models while preserving perceptual quality. However, existing methods primarily optimize efficiency and output fidelity, often neglecting critical properties of the original trajectory. In this work, we identify a key missing property: sensitivity to initial noise, whose degradation impairs downstream control methods relying on noise-based optimization and manipulation. We trace this issue to standard distillation objectives that enforce pointwise output alignment, inadvertently flattening the input-output landscape and suppressing the teacher's local geometric structure. To address this, we propose Geometry-Aware Distillation (GAD), a sensitivity-preserving framework that aligns the local functional behavior of teacher and student models. Specifically, GAD matches Jacobian-vector products with respect to input noise, enabling the student to reproduce the teacher's differential response to perturbations. Extensive experiments across multiple T2I paradigms and noise-driven control tasks demonstrate that GAD significantly restores sensitivity and improves diversity while maintaining high visual fidelity. Code is available at https://github.com/Hannah1102/GAD.
Abstract:With the rapid advancement of image generative models, generative data augmentation has become an effective way to enrich training images, especially when only small-scale datasets are available. At the same time, in practical applications, generative data augmentation can be vulnerable to clean-label backdoor attacks, which aim to bypass human inspection. However, based on theoretical analysis and preliminary experiments, we observe that directly applying existing pixel-level clean-label backdoor attack methods (e.g., COMBAT) to generated images results in low attack success rates. This motivates us to move beyond pixel-level triggers and focus instead on the latent feature level. To this end, we propose InvLBA, an invisible clean-label backdoor attack method for generative data augmentation by latent perturbation. We theoretically prove that the generalization of the clean accuracy and attack success rates of InvLBA can be guaranteed. Experiments on multiple datasets show that our method improves the attack success rate by 46.43% on average, with almost no reduction in clean accuracy and high robustness against SOTA defense methods.