Learning to Query History: Nonstationary Classification via Learned Retrieval

Nonstationarity is ubiquitous in practical classification settings, leading deployed models to perform poorly even when they generalize well to holdout sets available at training time. We address this by reframing nonstationary classification as time series prediction: rather than predicting from the current input alone, we condition the classifier on a sequence of historical labeled examples that extends beyond the training cutoff. To scale to large sequences, we introduce a learned discrete retrieval mechanism that samples relevant historical examples via input-dependent queries, trained end-to-end with the classifier using a score-based gradient estimator. This enables the full corpus of historical data to remain on an arbitrary filesystem during training and deployment. Experiments on synthetic benchmarks and Amazon Reviews '23 (electronics category) show improved robustness to distribution shift compared to standard classifiers, with VRAM scaling predictably as the length of the historical data sequence increases.

Learning to Localize Leakage of Cryptographic Sensitive Variables

While cryptographic algorithms such as the ubiquitous Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are secure, *physical implementations* of these algorithms in hardware inevitably 'leak' sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. A particularly insidious form of leakage arises from the fact that hardware consumes power and emits radiation in a manner that is statistically associated with the data it processes and the instructions it executes. Supervised deep learning has emerged as a state-of-the-art tool for carrying out *side-channel attacks*, which exploit this leakage by learning to map power/radiation measurements throughout encryption to the sensitive data operated on during that encryption. In this work we develop a principled deep learning framework for determining the relative leakage due to measurements recorded at different points in time, in order to inform *defense* against such attacks. This information is invaluable to cryptographic hardware designers for understanding *why* their hardware leaks and how they can mitigate it (e.g. by indicating the particular sections of code or electronic components which are responsible). Our framework is based on an adversarial game between a family of classifiers trained to estimate the conditional distributions of sensitive data given subsets of measurements, and a budget-constrained noise distribution which probabilistically erases individual measurements to maximize the loss of these classifiers. We demonstrate our method's efficacy and ability to overcome limitations of prior work through extensive experimental comparison with 8 baseline methods using 3 evaluation metrics and 6 publicly-available power/EM trace datasets from AES, ECC and RSA implementations. We provide an open-source PyTorch implementation of these experiments.

Power side-channel leakage localization through adversarial training of deep neural networks

Supervised deep learning has emerged as an effective tool for carrying out power side-channel attacks on cryptographic implementations. While increasingly-powerful deep learning-based attacks are regularly published, comparatively-little work has gone into using deep learning to defend against these attacks. In this work we propose a technique for identifying which timesteps in a power trace are responsible for leaking a cryptographic key, through an adversarial game between a deep learning-based side-channel attacker which seeks to classify a sensitive variable from the power traces recorded during encryption, and a trainable noise generator which seeks to thwart this attack by introducing a minimal amount of noise into the power traces. We demonstrate on synthetic datasets that our method can outperform existing techniques in the presence of common countermeasures such as Boolean masking and trace desynchronization. Results on real datasets are weak because the technique is highly sensitive to hyperparameters and early-stop point, and we lack a holdout dataset with ground truth knowledge of leaking points for model selection. Nonetheless, we believe our work represents an important first step towards deep side-channel leakage localization without relying on strong assumptions about the implementation or the nature of its leakage. An open-source PyTorch implementation of our experiments is provided.