Silicon Bureaucracy and AI Test-Oriented Education: Contamination Sensitivity and Score Confidence in LLM Benchmarks

Public benchmarks increasingly govern how large language models (LLMs) are ranked, selected, and deployed. We frame this benchmark-centered regime as Silicon Bureaucracy and AI Test-Oriented Education, and argue that it rests on a fragile assumption: that benchmark scores directly reflect genuine generalization. In practice, however, such scores may conflate exam-oriented competence with principled capability, especially when contamination and semantic leakage are difficult to exclude from modern training pipelines. We therefore propose an audit framework for analyzing contamination sensitivity and score confidence in LLM benchmarks. Using a router-worker setup, we compare a clean-control condition with noisy conditions in which benchmark problems are systematically deleted, rewritten, and perturbed before being passed downstream. For a genuinely clean benchmark, noisy conditions should not consistently outperform the clean-control baseline. Yet across multiple models, we find widespread but heterogeneous above-baseline gains under noisy conditions, indicating that benchmark-related cues may be reassembled and can reactivate contamination-related memory. These results suggest that similar benchmark scores may carry substantially different levels of confidence. Rather than rejecting benchmarks altogether, we argue that benchmark-based evaluation should be supplemented with explicit audits of contamination sensitivity and score confidence.

Are LLMs Vulnerable to Preference-Undermining Attacks (PUA)? A Factorial Analysis Methodology for Diagnosing the Trade-off between Preference Alignment and Real-World Validity

Large Language Model (LLM) training often optimizes for preference alignment, rewarding outputs that are perceived as helpful and interaction-friendly. However, this preference-oriented objective can be exploited: manipulative prompts can steer responses toward user-appeasing agreement and away from truth-oriented correction. In this work, we investigate whether aligned models are vulnerable to Preference-Undermining Attacks (PUA), a class of manipulative prompting strategies designed to exploit the model's desire to please user preferences at the expense of truthfulness. We propose a diagnostic methodology that provides a finer-grained and more directive analysis than aggregate benchmark scores, using a factorial evaluation framework to decompose prompt-induced shifts into interpretable effects of system objectives (truth- vs. preference-oriented) and PUA-style dialogue factors (directive control, personal derogation, conditional approval, reality denial) within a controlled $2 \times 2^4$ design. Surprisingly, more advanced models are sometimes more susceptible to manipulative prompts. Beyond the dominant reality-denial factor, we observe model-specific sign reversals and interactions with PUA-style factors, suggesting tailored defenses rather than uniform robustness. These findings offer a novel, reproducible factorial evaluation methodology that provides finer-grained diagnostics for post-training processes like RLHF, enabling better trade-offs in the product iteration of LLMs by offering a more nuanced understanding of preference alignment risks and the impact of manipulative prompts.