Overthinking: Amplifying Reasoning Weights to Extract Learned Secrets

Black box auditing of language models is an essential pre-deployment tool, but it may miss subtle forms of misalignment and hidden information. To better elicit hidden information during an auditing process, we introduce \emph{overthinking}: the process of using reasoning task vectors to amplify the propensity to think out loud of reasoning models. Given the parameters of a non-reasoning instruct model $M$ and reasoning-distilled model $R$, we define the \emph{overthinking model} as $\boldsymbolθ_{\mathcal{O}_α} = \boldsymbolθ_{\mathcal{M}} + α(\boldsymbolθ_{\mathcal{R}} - \boldsymbolθ_{\mathcal{M}})$, where $α> 1$ amplifies reasoning beyond the pure reasoning model $R$. Additionally, we introduce new layer-wise attenuation strategies that selectively amplify reasoning without losing quality and coherence of model outputs. We demonstrate that overthinking models are more likely to reveal hidden information across four experimental settings, across 2B-32B models. Our findings suggest that reasoning amplification may surface secrets or unintended behaviors acquired during training up to $10\times$ more frequently than the original reasoning model. How secrets surface depends on the secret type: some require perturbation along the reasoning direction, while others yield to any sufficiently large weight perturbation.

Self-Attribution Bias: When AI Monitors Go Easy on Themselves

Agentic systems increasingly rely on language models to monitor their own behavior. For example, coding agents may self critique generated code for pull request approval or assess the safety of tool-use actions. We show that this design pattern can fail when the action is presented in a previous or in the same assistant turn instead of being presented by the user in a user turn. We define self-attribution bias as the tendency of a model to evaluate an action as more correct or less risky when the action is implicitly framed as its own, compared to when the same action is evaluated under off-policy attribution. Across four coding and tool-use datasets, we find that monitors fail to report high-risk or low-correctness actions more often when evaluation follows a previous assistant turn in which the action was generated, compared to when the same action is evaluated in a new context presented in a user turn. In contrast, explicitly stating that the action comes from the monitor does not by itself induce self-attribution bias. Because monitors are often evaluated on fixed examples rather than on their own generated actions, these evaluations can make monitors appear more reliable than they actually are in deployment, leading developers to unknowingly deploy inadequate monitors in agentic systems.