Abstract:Interactive video world models generate rollouts autoregressively under an action stream, yet they are trained and evaluated almost exclusively on factual prediction. We study counterfactual generation inside the rollout: given a trajectory the model has itself generated, what would have happened had the actions differed from step t* onward? We formalize noise-coupled twin rollouts --- a factual and a counterfactual branch sharing the generated prefix and the future exogenous noise sequence, diverging only in the action stream at an intervention point. Because the factual branch is self-generated, its exogenous noise is known exactly: the abduction step of Pearl's counterfactual procedure is exact by construction, sidestepping the approximate-inversion problem faced by editing-based pipelines. Noise coupling further turns the minimal-change principle into a per-sample verifiable property: we define a spatiotemporal locality metric that penalizes divergence outside the causal descendants of the intervention, computable against simulator ground truth without a learned judge. Forking the simulator state at t* yields ground-truth counterfactual re-renders, which we use as verifiable rewards for post-training. This note establishes the formal framework, metric definitions, and positioning; experiments are forthcoming.
Abstract:Model merging has become the default way to give an aligned language model new skills without retraining: a practitioner folds task vectors from math, code, or domain specialists into a safety-aligned base using task arithmetic, TIES, or DARE. This convenience is known to carry a safety cost, but almost all of that evidence rests on static refusal tests: fixed harmful prompts scored for compliance. We argue this is misleading. Because safety alignment is "shallow," concentrated in the first few generated tokens, a merged model's static refusal can stay clean while a real adaptive attack still breaks it. We introduce SkillSafe-Bench, a controlled benchmark that scores skill-merged models on static refusal, adaptive jailbreak robustness, and capability retention under a conservative two-judge AND rule. Across six open-weight bases (five families, two scales), static safety does not predict robustness to attack: under a semantic template attack, safe-looking merges on the fragile bases (both Qwen scales and Gemma) are jailbroken 60-76% of the time while others (Llama, Phi-4) stay robust. We further show the static effect of merging is base-conditional, characterize same-recipe abliteration-style safety erosion through a data-free geometric signal (the overlap of a task vector with a safety subspace), and outline SubSafe-Merge, which projects this overlap away to remove that erosion at held capability. Adaptive evaluation is not optional for merged LLMs: the models that most need it look safe under static screening.