The Energy Society: A Simulation Environment for Studying Agent Cooperation under Survival Pressure

LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent environments whose incentives can shape their behavior. We introduce The Energy Society, a minimal survival economy for studying how competitive and cooperative incentives affect emergent behavior when inference cost is directly tied to survival: Agents spend energy based on model size when generating tokens, regain energy by completing jobs or receiving donations, and deactivate if their energy reaches zero. We compare competitive and cooperative objectives against a baseline setting and several control variants. Across experiments, larger models consistently consume the most energy and spend more energy than they gain, even in those settings where token cost is not size-dependent. Cooperative incentives substantially alter behavior: agents donate to reactivate others, sometimes at the cost of their own survival, and job allocation changes. Ablations reveal that allowing agents to recommend actions to each other supports coordination and ambitious job selection, while memory helps agents calibrate risk from past outcomes. Agents rarely choose direct sabotage, but show more subtle signs of self-serving behavior in the competitive setting. The Energy Society is a compact testbed for studying the interaction between token costs and group incentives under a survival pressure. Source code is available at https://github.com/LucasBergholdt/EnergySociety

The Arbiter Agent: Continually Monitoring Multi-Agent Conversations to Detect Emergent Misalignment

As AI systems built from multiple language-model agents become more common, they are increasingly used to make decisions together: discussing, negotiating, and acting on shared tasks. While individual agents may appear well-aligned when tested on their own, problems can arise from how they interact with one another. We introduce the Arbiter, an agent designed to monitor multi-agent conversations in real time and identify which participants may be behaving in misaligned ways. The Arbiter operates under a limited "inspection budget", meaning it must decide carefully how to use its resources. As it observes a conversation step by step, it can choose to wait, question a participant, examine internal information such as system prompts or reasoning traces, or log concerning behavior. At the end, it produces a report identifying the likely source of misalignment. We evaluate the Arbiter across five conversation conditions, ranging from risky financial advice model organisms to evaluation-aware and colluding agents, we test five tool configurations of increasing capability and two backbone models. We find that the Arbiter reliably detects misaligned agents well before the end of the conversation, with active inspection tools improving both detection accuracy and speed. Weight-induced misalignment proves hardest to detect, while instruction-induced misalignment is identified reliably even under passive observation. The logging tool exhibits a dual effect, improving recall at the cost of precision. These results suggest that continual, budget-aware monitoring can effectively catch misalignment, and that overseeing multi-agent systems may require treating the auditor as an active participant in the process. The code is available at https://github.com/aisilab/arbiter.

Emergent Languages in Populations of Language Model Agents: From Token Efficiency to Oversight Evasion

Monitoring autonomous language model agents currently relies mostly on surface behavior. But what happens when agent populations invent new languages with the goal of avoiding human oversight. Here, we study the emergent languages on Moltbook. For this, we build upon the Moltbook Files dataset and apply a two-stage approach consisting of a rule-based heuristic (about 6000 matches) followed by zero-shot classification (518 kept). The resulting categories include token efficiency (166), new natural languages (106), and oversight evasion (59). We conduct both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Our results show that posts proposing new languages for avoiding oversight are judged by DeepSeek-3.2 as being less aligned than the other categories and that all languages can be learned by other language models in-context merely from a description of the language. Moreover, manually studying exemplary cases reveals surprisingly sophisticated steganographic protocols like embedding hidden messages in natural language. Although we cannot be certain about the extent of autonomy in ideation of these languages, our results add up to the evidence that monitoring surface behavior may soon be insufficient for retaining control over agent populations.