2-Step Agent: A Framework for the Interaction of a Decision Maker with AI Decision Support

Across a growing number of fields, human decision making is supported by predictions from AI models. However, we still lack a deep understanding of the effects of adoption of these technologies. In this paper, we introduce a general computational framework, the 2-Step Agent, which models the effects of AI-assisted decision making. Our framework uses Bayesian methods for causal inference to model 1) how a prediction on a new observation affects the beliefs of a rational Bayesian agent, and 2) how this change in beliefs affects the downstream decision and subsequent outcome. Using this framework, we show by simulations how a single misaligned prior belief can be sufficient for decision support to result in worse downstream outcomes compared to no decision support. Our results reveal several potential pitfalls of AI-driven decision support and highlight the need for thorough model documentation and proper user training.

Cognitive Modeling with Scaffolded LLMs: A Case Study of Referential Expression Generation

To what extent can LLMs be used as part of a cognitive model of language generation? In this paper, we approach this question by exploring a neuro-symbolic implementation of an algorithmic cognitive model of referential expression generation by Dale & Reiter (1995). The symbolic task analysis implements the generation as an iterative procedure that scaffolds symbolic and gpt-3.5-turbo-based modules. We compare this implementation to an ablated model and a one-shot LLM-only baseline on the A3DS dataset (Tsvilodub & Franke, 2023). We find that our hybrid approach is cognitively plausible and performs well in complex contexts, while allowing for more open-ended modeling of language generation in a larger domain.

Bayesian Statistical Modeling with Predictors from LLMs

State of the art large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance on a variety of benchmark tasks and are increasingly used as components in larger applications, where LLM-based predictions serve as proxies for human judgements or decision. This raises questions about the human-likeness of LLM-derived information, alignment with human intuition, and whether LLMs could possibly be considered (parts of) explanatory models of (aspects of) human cognition or language use. To shed more light on these issues, we here investigate the human-likeness of LLMs' predictions for multiple-choice decision tasks from the perspective of Bayesian statistical modeling. Using human data from a forced-choice experiment on pragmatic language use, we find that LLMs do not capture the variance in the human data at the item-level. We suggest different ways of deriving full distributional predictions from LLMs for aggregate, condition-level data, and find that some, but not all ways of obtaining condition-level predictions yield adequate fits to human data. These results suggests that assessment of LLM performance depends strongly on seemingly subtle choices in methodology, and that LLMs are at best predictors of human behavior at the aggregate, condition-level, for which they are, however, not designed to, or usually used to, make predictions in the first place.