Computational models of pragmatic reasoning with flexible generation of meaning and expression alternatives

Pragmatic language use requires reasoning about alternatives: the alternative expressions a speaker might have chosen, or the alternative interpretations a listener might entertain. Formal and computational models of pragmatics must therefore specify the sets of alternatives that interlocutors reason over, which is often done through manual specification. Here we propose a framework, ScAffolded Generative models for Explanation (SAGE), that combines the explanatory transparency of cognitive models with the generative flexibility of language models (LMs). SAGE decomposes a pragmatic process into three kinds of modules: proposers, which use LMs to generate an open-ended space of candidate alternatives; evaluators, which assess those alternatives (e.g., their semantics, complexity, or typicality); and selectors, which implement the rule-based computational steps of a cognitively motivated task analysis. We assess SAGE in three case studies spanning pragmatic generation and interpretation-referential expression generation, manner (M-)implicatures, and Gricean conversational implicatures. SAGE models are evaluated critically using established methods from computational cognitive modeling, including ablations, baseline comparisons, and quantitative fit to human data. Across studies, SAGE models achieved high accuracy and often outperformed baselines, but component-level analyses reveal an asymmetry: LM proposers reliably generated alternatives well-suited to pragmatic modeling, whereas LM evaluators are better at providing intuitive judgements rather than judgements of theoretical or formal measures. We discuss the promise and the limitations of neuro-symbolic models as candidate explanatory accounts of human pragmatic language use.

TypeProbe: Recovering Type Representations from Hidden States of Pre-trained Code Models

State-of-the-art code models achieve impressive performance, yet the extent to which they internally encode type information remains poorly understood. We probe the residual streams of pretrained code models for internal type representations using a parallel dataset of Java and Python code examples. Our results show that cross-lingual type representations emerge even from untyped code. Moreover, we test whether hidden states linearly encode the result type implied by typed function application by training probes on one language to infer argument and result types in the other. Finally, we find that this structure is partly robust to lexical perturbations and cross-language syntactic variations. To the best of our knowledge, prior work on interpretability of code models has not directly targeted formal type semantics or cross-lingual type representations. We release our code and datasets.

Compositionality and the lexicon in evolutionary semantics

Formal semantics has shown that sentence meanings arise by recursively composing lexical meanings, yet much of the literature on semantic universals models either lexicons with fixed signal structures or holistic composition without interpretable lexical parts. We introduce a framework that integrates this fundamental insight of formal semantics in evolutionary modeling, by allowing lexical meanings and a composition function to co-evolve under pressures for conceptual simplicity and communicative accuracy. We apply this framework to the evolution of quantificational meaning. Analyzing the Pareto frontier, we find that the most well-known semantic universal, conservativity, emerges as an efficient system-wide abstraction. The account is sensitive to syntactic structure and helps reconcile tensions between empirical evidence on quantifier learnability and prior evolutionary models. More broadly, the results demonstrate that the picture of sentential meaning developed in formal semantics can be productively combined with evolutionary modeling. The framework offers a template for studying universals that involve global compression within a grammatical category, semantic specialization of syntactic arguments, and the co-evolution of lexical and compositional meaning.

2-Step Agent: A Framework for the Interaction of a Decision Maker with AI Decision Support

Across a growing number of fields, human decision making is supported by predictions from AI models. However, we still lack a deep understanding of the effects of adoption of these technologies. In this paper, we introduce a general computational framework, the 2-Step Agent, which models the effects of AI-assisted decision making. Our framework uses Bayesian methods for causal inference to model 1) how a prediction on a new observation affects the beliefs of a rational Bayesian agent, and 2) how this change in beliefs affects the downstream decision and subsequent outcome. Using this framework, we show by simulations how a single misaligned prior belief can be sufficient for decision support to result in worse downstream outcomes compared to no decision support. Our results reveal several potential pitfalls of AI-driven decision support and highlight the need for thorough model documentation and proper user training.

Cognitive Modeling with Scaffolded LLMs: A Case Study of Referential Expression Generation

To what extent can LLMs be used as part of a cognitive model of language generation? In this paper, we approach this question by exploring a neuro-symbolic implementation of an algorithmic cognitive model of referential expression generation by Dale & Reiter (1995). The symbolic task analysis implements the generation as an iterative procedure that scaffolds symbolic and gpt-3.5-turbo-based modules. We compare this implementation to an ablated model and a one-shot LLM-only baseline on the A3DS dataset (Tsvilodub & Franke, 2023). We find that our hybrid approach is cognitively plausible and performs well in complex contexts, while allowing for more open-ended modeling of language generation in a larger domain.

Bayesian Statistical Modeling with Predictors from LLMs

State of the art large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance on a variety of benchmark tasks and are increasingly used as components in larger applications, where LLM-based predictions serve as proxies for human judgements or decision. This raises questions about the human-likeness of LLM-derived information, alignment with human intuition, and whether LLMs could possibly be considered (parts of) explanatory models of (aspects of) human cognition or language use. To shed more light on these issues, we here investigate the human-likeness of LLMs' predictions for multiple-choice decision tasks from the perspective of Bayesian statistical modeling. Using human data from a forced-choice experiment on pragmatic language use, we find that LLMs do not capture the variance in the human data at the item-level. We suggest different ways of deriving full distributional predictions from LLMs for aggregate, condition-level data, and find that some, but not all ways of obtaining condition-level predictions yield adequate fits to human data. These results suggests that assessment of LLM performance depends strongly on seemingly subtle choices in methodology, and that LLMs are at best predictors of human behavior at the aggregate, condition-level, for which they are, however, not designed to, or usually used to, make predictions in the first place.