EvoQRE: Modeling Bounded Rationality in Safety-Critical Traffic Simulation via Evolutionary Quantal Response Equilibrium

Existing traffic simulation frameworks for autonomous vehicles typically rely on imitation learning or game-theoretic approaches that solve for Nash or coarse correlated equilibria, implicitly assuming perfectly rational agents. However, human drivers exhibit bounded rationality, making approximately optimal decisions under cognitive and perceptual constraints. We propose EvoQRE, a principled framework for modeling safety-critical traffic interactions as general-sum Markov games solved via Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) and evolutionary game dynamics. EvoQRE integrates a pre-trained generative world model with entropy-regularized replicator dynamics, capturing stochastic human behavior while maintaining equilibrium structure. We provide rigorous theoretical results, proving that the proposed dynamics converge to Logit-QRE under a two-timescale stochastic approximation with an explicit convergence rate of O(log k / k^{1/3}) under weak monotonicity assumptions. We further extend QRE to continuous action spaces using mixture-based and energy-based policy representations. Experiments on the Waymo Open Motion Dataset and nuPlan benchmark demonstrate that EvoQRE achieves state-of-the-art realism, improved safety metrics, and controllable generation of diverse safety-critical scenarios through interpretable rationality parameters.

Understanding LLM Agent Behaviours via Game Theory: Strategy Recognition, Biases and Multi-Agent Dynamics

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly operate as autonomous decision-makers in interactive and multi-agent systems and human societies, understanding their strategic behaviour has profound implications for safety, coordination, and the design of AI-driven social and economic infrastructures. Assessing such behaviour requires methods that capture not only what LLMs output, but the underlying intentions that guide their decisions. In this work, we extend the FAIRGAME framework to systematically evaluate LLM behaviour in repeated social dilemmas through two complementary advances: a payoff-scaled Prisoners Dilemma isolating sensitivity to incentive magnitude, and an integrated multi-agent Public Goods Game with dynamic payoffs and multi-agent histories. These environments reveal consistent behavioural signatures across models and languages, including incentive-sensitive cooperation, cross-linguistic divergence and end-game alignment toward defection. To interpret these patterns, we train traditional supervised classification models on canonical repeated-game strategies and apply them to FAIRGAME trajectories, showing that LLMs exhibit systematic, model- and language-dependent behavioural intentions, with linguistic framing at times exerting effects as strong as architectural differences. Together, these findings provide a unified methodological foundation for auditing LLMs as strategic agents and reveal systematic cooperation biases with direct implications for AI governance, collective decision-making, and the design of safe multi-agent systems.