Can we predict how well a team of individuals will perform together? How should individuals be rewarded for their contributions to the team performance? Cooperative game theory gives us a powerful set of tools for answering these questions: the Characteristic Function (CF) and solution concepts like the Shapley Value (SV). There are two major difficulties in applying these techniques to real world problems: first, the CF is rarely given to us and needs to be learned from data. Second, the SV is combinatorial in nature. We introduce a parametric model called cooperative game abstractions (CGAs) for estimating CFs from data. CGAs are easy to learn, readily interpretable, and crucially allow linear-time computation of the SV. We provide identification results and sample complexity bounds for CGA models as well as error bounds in the estimation of the SV using CGAs. We apply our methods to study teams of artificial RL agents as well as real world teams from professional sports.
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are a widely used model for dynamic decision-making problems. However, MDPs require precise specification of model parameters, and often the cost of a policy can be highly sensitive to the estimated parameters. Robust MDPs ameliorate this issue by allowing one to specify uncertainty sets around the parameters, which leads to a non-convex optimization problem. This non-convex problem can be solved via the Value Iteration algorithm, but Value Iteration requires repeatedly solving convex programs that become prohibitively expensive as MDPs grow larger. We propose an algorithmic framework based on first-order methods, where we interleave approximate value iteration updates with a first-order-based computation of the robust Bellman update. Our algorithm relies on having a proximal setup for the uncertainty sets. We go on to instantiate this proximal setup for $s$-rectangular ellipsoidal uncertainty sets and Kullback-Leibler uncertainty sets. By carefully controlling the warm-starts of our first-order method and the increasing approximation rate at each Value Iteration update, our algorithm achieves a convergence rate of $O \left( A^{2} S^{3}\log(S)\log(\epsilon^{-1}) \epsilon^{-1} \right)$ for the best choice of parameters, where $S,A$ are the numbers of states and actions. Our dependence on the number of states and actions is significantly better than that of Value Iteration algorithms. In numerical experiments on ellipsoidal uncertainty sets, we show that our algorithm is significantly more scalable than state-of-the-art approaches. In the class of $s$-rectangular robust MDPs, to the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first to address Kullback-Leibler uncertainty sets.
Monte-Carlo counterfactual regret minimization (MCCFR) is the state-of-the-art algorithm for solving sequential games that are too large for full tree traversals. It works by using gradient estimates that can be computed via sampling. However, stochastic methods for sequential games have not been investigated extensively beyond MCCFR. In this paper we develop a new framework for developing stochastic regret minimization methods. This framework allows us to use any regret-minimization algorithm, coupled with any gradient estimator. The MCCFR algorithm can be analyzed as a special case of our framework, and this analysis leads to significantly-stronger theoretical on convergence, while simultaneously yielding a simplified proof. Our framework allows us to instantiate several new stochastic methods for solving sequential games. We show extensive experiments on three games, where some variants of our methods outperform MCCFR.
We study the performance of optimistic regret-minimization algorithms for both minimizing regret in, and computing Nash equilibria of, zero-sum extensive-form games. In order to apply these algorithms to extensive-form games, a distance-generating function is needed. We study the use of the dilated entropy and dilated Euclidean distance functions. For the dilated Euclidean distance function we prove the first explicit bounds on the strong-convexity parameter for general treeplexes. Furthermore, we show that the use of dilated distance-generating functions enable us to decompose the mirror descent algorithm, and its optimistic variant, into local mirror descent algorithms at each information set. This decomposition mirrors the structure of the counterfactual regret minimization framework, and enables important techniques in practice, such as distributed updates and pruning of cold parts of the game tree. Our algorithms provably converge at a rate of $T^{-1}$, which is superior to prior counterfactual regret minimization algorithms. We experimentally compare to the popular algorithm CFR+, which has a theoretical convergence rate of $T^{-0.5}$ in theory, but is known to often converge at a rate of $T^{-1}$, or better, in practice. We give an example matrix game where CFR+ experimentally converges at a relatively slow rate of $T^{-0.74}$, whereas our optimistic methods converge faster than $T^{-1}$. We go on to show that our fast rate also holds in the Kuhn poker game, which is an extensive-form game. For games with deeper game trees however, we find that CFR+ is still faster. Finally we show that when the goal is minimizing regret, rather than computing a Nash equilibrium, our optimistic methods can outperform CFR+, even in deep game trees.
We consider the problem of dividing items between individuals in a way that is fair both in the sense of distributional fairness and in the sense of not having disparate impact across protected classes. An important existing mechanism for distributionally fair division is competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI). Unfortunately, CEEI will not, in general, respect disparate impact constraints. We consider two types of disparate impact measures: requiring that allocations be similar across protected classes and requiring that average utility levels be similar across protected classes. We modify the standard CEEI algorithm in two ways: equitable equilibrium from equal incomes, which removes disparate impact in allocations, and competitive equilibrium from equitable incomes which removes disparate impact in attained utility levels. We show analytically that removing disparate impact in outcomes breaks several of CEEI's desirable properties such as envy, regret, Pareto optimality, and incentive compatibility. By contrast, we can remove disparate impact in attained utility levels without affecting these properties. Finally, we experimentally evaluate the tradeoffs between efficiency, equity, and disparate impact in a recommender-system based market.
We consider the problem of using logged data to make predictions about what would happen if we changed the `rules of the game' in a multi-agent system. This task is difficult because in many cases we observe actions individuals take but not their private information or their full reward functions. In addition, agents are strategic, so when the rules change, they will also change their actions. Existing methods (e.g. structural estimation, inverse reinforcement learning) make counterfactual predictions by constructing a model of the game, adding the assumption that agents' behavior comes from optimizing given some goals, and then inverting observed actions to learn agent's underlying utility function (a.k.a. type). Once the agent types are known, making counterfactual predictions amounts to solving for the equilibrium of the counterfactual environment. This approach imposes heavy assumptions such as rationality of the agents being observed, correctness of the analyst's model of the environment/parametric form of the agents' utility functions, and various other conditions to make point identification possible. We propose a method for analyzing the sensitivity of counterfactual conclusions to violations of these assumptions. We refer to this method as robust multi-agent counterfactual prediction (RMAC). We apply our technique to investigating the robustness of counterfactual claims for classic environments in market design: auctions, school choice, and social choice. Importantly, we show RMAC can be used in regimes where point identification is impossible (e.g. those which have multiple equilibria or non-injective maps from type distributions to outcomes).
First-order methods are known to be among the fastest algorithms for solving large-scale convex-concave saddle-point problems. Algorithms that achieve a theoretical convergence rate on the order of $1/T$ are known, but these often rely on uniformly averaging iterates in order to get the guaranteed rate. In contrast, using the last iterate has repeatedly been found to perform better in practice, but with no guarantee on convergence rate. In this paper we propose using averaging schemes with increasing weight on recent iterates, which leads to a guaranteed $1/T$ convergence rate, while capturing the practical performance of using the last iterate. We show this for Chambolle and Pock's primal-dual algorithm, and mirror prox. We present numerical results on computing Nash equilibria in matrix games, competitive equilibria in Fisher markets, and image denoising via total-variation minimization under the $\ell_1$ norm. In all cases we find that our averaging schemes lead to much better performance than uniform averaging, and sometimes even better performance than using the last iterate.