Abstract:Industrial humanoid robots are constrained less by locomotion or manipulation capability than by the immaturity of functional safety certification for legged platforms. The root difficulty is that the safe state of a legged robot is an actively-controlled state, which violates the fail-passive assumption underlying ISO~13849-1 / EN~60204-1: removing power from a walking biped causes an uncontrolled fall, so classical de-energization is itself a hazard. We term this the fail-passive gap and use a certified external safety chain (light curtain, emergency stop, fail-safe input, fail-safe PLC, and wireless PROFIsafe) as an instrument to locate it precisely: because the external chain is closed and quantifiable with established methods (PFHD, DC, CCF, PL/SILCL), the residual uncertifiable element is pinpointed to the robot-side reaction chain. Using a Siemens fail-safe S7-1500 emergency-stop reference, we show its certifiable Reaction subsystem is contactor-based power removal (Stop Category~0)---exactly the element a balancing humanoid cannot have. We deliberately do not claim end-to-end certified PL~e / SIL~3. We validate the approach on a Unitree G1 EDU pick-and-place cell in a 3m x 1.5m semi-enclosed workspace, and contribute a humanoid-specific analysis of the active safe state (fall-as-hazard, single-support stop bounds, balancing-policy residual risk, ISO~13855 separation) and a provenance-labeled timing budget. Hosting an industrial software-defined automation (SDA) controller on the robot, co-located with the balancing policy, moves robot-side PROFINET/PROFIsafe reception onto a standardized IEC~61131-3 interface; because the G1's onboard compute is not safety-rated hardware, this endpoint is not a certified safety runtime, which reinforces rather than resolves the fail-passive gap and localizes it to the SDA-to-balancing-policy interface.
Abstract:Emergency stop (E-stop) mechanisms are the de facto standard for robot safety. However, for humanoid robots, abruptly cutting power can itself cause catastrophic failures; instead, an emergency stop must execute a predefined fallback controller that preserves balance and drives the robot toward a minimum-risk condition. This raises a critical question: from which states can a humanoid robot safely execute such a stop? In this work, we formalize emergency stopping for humanoids as a policy-dependent safe-stoppability problem and use data-driven approaches to characterize the safe-stoppable envelope. We introduce PRISM (Proactive Refinement of Importance-sampled Stoppability Monitor), a simulation-driven framework that learns a neural predictor for state-level stoppability. PRISM iteratively refines the decision boundary using importance sampling, enabling targeted exploration of rare but safety-critical states. This targeted exploration significantly improves data efficiency while reducing false-safe predictions under a fixed simulation budget. We further demonstrate sim-to-real transfer by deploying the pretrained monitor on a real humanoid platform. Results show that modeling safety as policy-dependent stoppability enables proactive safety monitoring and supports scalable certification of fail-safe behaviors for humanoid robots.
Abstract:Unmanned Aerial Vehicles(UAVs) are attaining more and more maneuverability and sensory ability as a promising teleoperation platform for intelligent interaction with the environments. This work presents a novel 5-degree-of-freedom (DoF) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) cyber-physical system for aerial manipulation. This UAV's body is capable of exerting powerful propulsion force in the longitudinal direction, decoupling the translational dynamics and the rotational dynamics on the longitudinal plane. A high-level impedance control law is proposed to drive the vehicle for trajectory tracking and interaction with the environments. In addition, a vision-based real-time target identification and tracking method integrating a YOLO v3 real-time object detector with feature tracking, and morphological operations is proposed to be implemented onboard the vehicle with support of model compression techniques to eliminate latency caused by video wireless transmission and heavy computation burden on traditional teleoperation platforms.