Analyzing Shapley Additive Explanations to Understand Anomaly Detection Algorithm Behaviors and Their Complementarity

Unsupervised anomaly detection is a challenging problem due to the diversity of data distributions and the lack of labels. Ensemble methods are often adopted to mitigate these challenges by combining multiple detectors, which can reduce individual biases and increase robustness. Yet building an ensemble that is genuinely complementary remains challenging, since many detectors rely on similar decision cues and end up producing redundant anomaly scores. As a result, the potential of ensemble learning is often limited by the difficulty of identifying models that truly capture different types of irregularities. To address this, we propose a methodology for characterizing anomaly detectors through their decision mechanisms. Using SHapley Additive exPlanations, we quantify how each model attributes importance to input features, and we use these attribution profiles to measure similarity between detectors. We show that detectors with similar explanations tend to produce correlated anomaly scores and identify largely overlapping anomalies. Conversely, explanation divergence reliably indicates complementary detection behavior. Our results demonstrate that explanation-driven metrics offer a different criterion than raw outputs for selecting models in an ensemble. However, we also demonstrate that diversity alone is insufficient; high individual model performance remains a prerequisite for effective ensembles. By explicitly targeting explanation diversity while maintaining model quality, we are able to construct ensembles that are more diverse, more complementary, and ultimately more effective for unsupervised anomaly detection.

Adaptive Agents in Spatial Double-Auction Markets: Modeling the Emergence of Industrial Symbiosis

Industrial symbiosis fosters circularity by enabling firms to repurpose residual resources, yet its emergence is constrained by socio-spatial frictions that shape costs, matching opportunities, and market efficiency. Existing models often overlook the interaction between spatial structure, market design, and adaptive firm behavior, limiting our understanding of where and how symbiosis arises. We develop an agent-based model where heterogeneous firms trade byproducts through a spatially embedded double-auction market, with prices and quantities emerging endogenously from local interactions. Leveraging reinforcement learning, firms adapt their bidding strategies to maximize profit while accounting for transport costs, disposal penalties, and resource scarcity. Simulation experiments reveal the economic and spatial conditions under which decentralized exchanges converge toward stable and efficient outcomes. Counterfactual regret analysis shows that sellers' strategies approach a near Nash equilibrium, while sensitivity analysis highlights how spatial structures and market parameters jointly govern circularity. Our model provides a basis for exploring policy interventions that seek to align firm incentives with sustainability goals, and more broadly demonstrates how decentralized coordination can emerge from adaptive agents in spatially constrained markets.