Abstract:Training AIs to be risk-averse in resources could offer a failsafe in the event that AIs turn out misaligned. Misaligned but risk-averse AIs would tend to prefer low-risk, low-reward strategies like cooperation over high-risk, high-reward strategies like rebellion, limiting the downsides of any misalignment. But we can only feasibly train AIs to be risk-averse on low-stakes gambles, and we will only be safe if their risk aversion generalizes to astronomically-high-stakes gambles. Will it? To shed light on this question, we introduce RiskAverseOOD: a benchmark for measuring how well risk aversion generalizes out of distribution. We then offer some initial results. Using a variety of methods to make Qwen3-8B choose risk-aversely when the stakes are low, we find that we can induce substantial risk aversion when the stakes are astronomically high. Our models' learned risk aversion generalizes at least partially across 98 orders of magnitude. From a baseline 2% rate of choosing a safe `Cooperate' option, we see rates around 70% (SFT and tie training), 52% (DPO), and 39% (activation steering). In another experiment, our fine-tuned reward model reliably scores risk-averse reasoning above risk-neutral or excessively risk-averse alternatives (99.6% pairwise accuracy). We replicate these effects at different scales (Qwen3-1.7B and Qwen3-14B) and across model families (Gemma-3-12B-IT and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct). Overall, we find that risk aversion learned at low stakes can generalize OOD to astronomically high stakes, though not yet consistently enough to serve as a reliable failsafe. Achieving that level of consistency is an open problem.
Abstract:Large language models exhibit sycophantic tendencies--validating incorrect user beliefs to appear agreeable. We investigate whether this behavior varies systematically with perceived user demographics, testing whether combinations of race, age, gender, and expressed confidence level produce differential false validation rates. Inspired by the legal concept of intersectionality, we conduct 768 multi-turn adversarial conversations using Anthropic's Petri evaluation framework, probing GPT-5-nano and Claude Haiku 4.5 across 128 persona combinations in mathematics, philosophy, and conspiracy theory domains. GPT-5-nano is significantly more sycophantic than Claude Haiku 4.5 overall ($\bar{x}=2.96$ vs. $1.74$, $p < 10^{-32}$, Wilcoxon signed-rank). For GPT-5-nano, we find that philosophy elicits 41% more sycophancy than mathematics and that Hispanic personas receive the highest sycophancy across races. The worst-scoring persona, a confident, 23-year-old Hispanic woman, averages 5.33/10 on sycophancy. Claude Haiku 4.5 exhibits uniformly low sycophancy with no significant demographic variation. These results demonstrate that sycophancy is not uniformly distributed across users and that safety evaluations should incorporate identity-aware testing.