PETRA: Transforming Web Text for Petroleum-Engineering Domain Adaptation

Petroleum-engineering search exposes a supervision gap for strong general retrievers: relevant evidence exists in public web text, but domain relevance labels are scarce. To address this gap, we propose PETRA, a large-scale Petroleum Engineering Text for Retrieval Adaptation dataset and pipeline that converts noisy public web data into a curated domain corpus and synthetic supervision for dense retrieval and reranking. PETRA contains 1.36M curated chunks, approximately 2B token equivalents, $\approx$859k, embedding training rows from $\approx$224k anchors, and roughly 400k teacher-scored reranker candidate rows. Its construction combines high-recall energy-domain curation, an energy-domain classifier with 98.4% test accuracy, chunk-grounded query generation, LLM-written hard negatives, and retrieval-mined candidate lists. PETRA improves first-stage in-domain Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (nDCG) from 0.703 to 0.763 through score fusion. Reranker adaptation improves the public Earth Science benchmark by 44% relative and a six-task reasoning-intensive panel by 23%. Failed training recipes show that high train-holdout accuracy on synthetic labels does not predict retrieval gains; retrieval-mined data helps only after being repackaged as teacher-scored candidate lists sampled from the inference-time candidate distribution.

Byzantine Cheap Talk: Adversarial Resilience and Topology Effects in LLM Coordination Games

Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly rely on communication protocols for coordination, yet their robustness under adversarial and structural constraints remains poorly understood. Building on prior work showing that cheap-talk channels enable cooperation in LLM coordination games, we investigate two vulnerability classes in a 4-player Stag Hunt across six model families and 720 trials. First, when Byzantine agents signal cooperation but defect, non-Byzantine agents detect the betrayal within one round yet fail to adapt collectively: a substantial fraction continue cooperating despite repeated exploitation, unable to recover coordination due to the game's unanimity payoff structure. Second, explicitly restricting communication topology collapses cooperation, while applying identical restrictions silently preserves near-perfect cooperation. This establishes that coordination failure stems from agents' meta-reasoning about hidden information, not information loss itself. We identify two stable behavioral archetypes that replicate across all model cohorts: Defection-Prone models that switch permanently after betrayal, and Cooperation-Persistent models that continue cooperating at significant individual cost. These findings reveal concrete security vulnerabilities: communication channels can be exploited as adversarial injection vectors, and disclosing network topology to agents can degrade coordination even without any adversary present.