In recent years, Quantum Machine Learning (QML) has increasingly captured the interest of researchers. Among the components in this domain, activation functions hold a fundamental and indispensable role. Our research focuses on the development of activation functions quantum circuits for integration into fault-tolerant quantum computing architectures, with an emphasis on minimizing $T$-depth. Specifically, we present novel implementations of ReLU and leaky ReLU activation functions, achieving constant $T$-depths of 4 and 8, respectively. Leveraging quantum lookup tables, we extend our exploration to other activation functions such as the sigmoid. This approach enables us to customize precision and $T$-depth by adjusting the number of qubits, making our results more adaptable to various application scenarios. This study represents a significant advancement towards enhancing the practicality and application of quantum machine learning.
Adversarial attacks on machine learning algorithms have been a key deterrent to the adoption of AI in many real-world use cases. They significantly undermine the ability of high-performance neural networks by forcing misclassifications. These attacks introduce minute and structured perturbations or alterations in the test samples, imperceptible to human annotators in general, but trained neural networks and other models are sensitive to it. Historically, adversarial attacks have been first identified and studied in the domain of image processing. In this paper, we study adversarial examples in the field of natural language processing, specifically text classification tasks. We investigate the reasons for adversarial vulnerability, particularly in relation to the inherent dimensionality of the model. Our key finding is that there is a very strong correlation between the embedding dimensionality of the adversarial samples and their effectiveness on models tuned with input samples with same embedding dimension. We utilize this sensitivity to design an adversarial defense mechanism. We use ensemble models of varying inherent dimensionality to thwart the attacks. This is tested on multiple datasets for its efficacy in providing robustness. We also study the problem of measuring adversarial perturbation using different distance metrics. For all of the aforementioned studies, we have run tests on multiple models with varying dimensionality and used a word-vector level adversarial attack to substantiate the findings.
This paper details the privacy and security landscape in today's cloud ecosystem and identifies that there is a gap in addressing the risks introduced by machine learning models. As machine learning algorithms continue to evolve and find applications across diverse domains, the need to categorize and quantify privacy and security risks becomes increasingly critical. With the emerging trend of AI-as-a-Service (AIaaS), machine learned AI models (or ML models) are deployed on the cloud by model providers and used by model consumers. We first survey the AIaaS landscape to document the various kinds of liabilities that ML models, especially Deep Neural Networks pose and then introduce a taxonomy to bridge this gap by holistically examining the risks that creators and consumers of ML models are exposed to and their known defences till date. Such a structured approach will be beneficial for ML model providers to create robust solutions. Likewise, ML model consumers will find it valuable to evaluate such solutions and understand the implications of their engagement with such services. The proposed taxonomies provide a foundational basis for solutions in private, secure and robust ML, paving the way for more transparent and resilient AI systems.
Adversarial attacks have proved to be the major impediment in the progress on research towards reliable machine learning solutions. Carefully crafted perturbations, imperceptible to human vision, can be added to images to force misclassification by an otherwise high performing neural network. To have a better understanding of the key contributors of such structured attacks, we searched for and studied spatially co-located patterns in the distribution of pixels in the input space. In this paper, we propose a framework for segregating and isolating regions within an input image which are particularly critical towards either classification (during inference), or adversarial vulnerability or both. We assert that during inference, the trained model looks at a specific region in the image, which we call Region of Importance (RoI); and the attacker looks at a region to alter/modify, which we call Region of Attack (RoA). The success of this approach could also be used to design a post-hoc adversarial defence method, as illustrated by our observations. This uses the notion of blocking out (we call neutralizing) that region of the image which is highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks but is not important for the task of classification. We establish the theoretical setup for formalising the process of segregation, isolation and neutralization and substantiate it through empirical analysis on standard benchmarking datasets. The findings strongly indicate that mapping features into the input space preserves the significant patterns typically observed in the feature-space while adding major interpretability and therefore simplifies potential defensive mechanisms.
Deep learning has emerged as a strong and efficient framework that can be applied to a broad spectrum of complex learning problems which were difficult to solve using the traditional machine learning techniques in the past. In the last few years, deep learning has advanced radically in such a way that it can surpass human-level performance on a number of tasks. As a consequence, deep learning is being extensively used in most of the recent day-to-day applications. However, security of deep learning systems are vulnerable to crafted adversarial examples, which may be imperceptible to the human eye, but can lead the model to misclassify the output. In recent times, different types of adversaries based on their threat model leverage these vulnerabilities to compromise a deep learning system where adversaries have high incentives. Hence, it is extremely important to provide robustness to deep learning algorithms against these adversaries. However, there are only a few strong countermeasures which can be used in all types of attack scenarios to design a robust deep learning system. In this paper, we attempt to provide a detailed discussion on different types of adversarial attacks with various threat models and also elaborate the efficiency and challenges of recent countermeasures against them.