Abstract:Recovering a unique causal graph from observational data is an ill-posed problem because multiple generating mechanisms can lead to the same observational distribution. This problem becomes solvable only by exploiting specific structural or distributional assumptions. While recent work has separately utilized time-series dynamics or multi-environment heterogeneity to constrain this problem, we integrate both as complementary sources of heterogeneity. This integration yields unified necessary identifiability conditions and enables a rigorous analysis of the statistical limits of recovery under thin versus heavy-tailed noise. In particular, temporal structure is shown to effectively substitute for missing environmental diversity, possibly achieving identifiability even under insufficient heterogeneity. Extending this analysis to heavy-tailed (Student's t) distributions, we demonstrate that while geometric identifiability conditions remain invariant, the sample complexity diverges significantly from the Gaussian baseline. Explicit information-theoretic bounds quantify this cost of robustness, establishing the fundamental limits of covariance-based causal graph recovery methods in realistic non-stationary systems. This work shifts the focus from whether causal structure is identifiable to whether it is statistically recoverable in practice.
Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities as autonomous agents through tool use, planning, and decision-making abilities, leading to their widespread adoption across diverse tasks. As task complexity grows, multi-agent LLM systems are increasingly used to solve problems collaboratively. However, safety and security of these systems remains largely under-explored. Existing benchmarks and datasets predominantly focus on single-agent settings, failing to capture the unique vulnerabilities of multi-agent dynamics and co-ordination. To address this gap, we introduce $\textbf{T}$hreats and $\textbf{A}$ttacks in $\textbf{M}$ulti-$\textbf{A}$gent $\textbf{S}$ystems ($\textbf{TAMAS}$), a benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness and safety of multi-agent LLM systems. TAMAS includes five distinct scenarios comprising 300 adversarial instances across six attack types and 211 tools, along with 100 harmless tasks. We assess system performance across ten backbone LLMs and three agent interaction configurations from Autogen and CrewAI frameworks, highlighting critical challenges and failure modes in current multi-agent deployments. Furthermore, we introduce Effective Robustness Score (ERS) to assess the tradeoff between safety and task effectiveness of these frameworks. Our findings show that multi-agent systems are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, underscoring the urgent need for stronger defenses. TAMAS provides a foundation for systematically studying and improving the safety of multi-agent LLM systems.