Anomaly Detection Dataset for Industrial Control Systems

Over the past few decades, Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have been targeted by cyberattacks and are becoming increasingly vulnerable as more ICSs are connected to the internet. Using Machine Learning (ML) for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) is a promising approach for ICS cyber protection, but the lack of suitable datasets for evaluating ML algorithms is a challenge. Although there are a few commonly used datasets, they may not reflect realistic ICS network data, lack necessary features for effective anomaly detection, or be outdated. This paper presents the 'ICS-Flow' dataset, which offers network data and process state variables logs for supervised and unsupervised ML-based IDS assessment. The network data includes normal and anomalous network packets and flows captured from simulated ICS components and emulated networks. The anomalies were injected into the system through various attack techniques commonly used by hackers to modify network traffic and compromise ICSs. We also proposed open-source tools, `ICSFlowGenerator' for generating network flow parameters from Raw network packets. The final dataset comprises over 25,000,000 raw network packets, network flow records, and process variable logs. The paper describes the methodology used to collect and label the dataset and provides a detailed data analysis. Finally, we implement several ML models, including the decision tree, random forest, and artificial neural network to detect anomalies and attacks, demonstrating that our dataset can be used effectively for training intrusion detection ML models.

Digital Twin-based Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems

Digital twins have recently gained significant interest in simulation, optimization, and predictive maintenance of Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Recent studies discuss the possibility of using digital twins for intrusion detection in industrial systems. Accordingly, this study contributes to a digital twin-based security framework for industrial control systems, extending its capabilities for simulation of attacks and defense mechanisms. Four types of process-aware attack scenarios are implemented on a standalone open-source digital twin of an industrial filling plant: command injection, network Denial of Service (DoS), calculated measurement modification, and naive measurement modification. A stacked ensemble classifier is proposed as the real-time intrusion detection, based on the offline evaluation of eight supervised machine learning algorithms. The designed stacked model outperforms previous methods in terms of F1-Score and accuracy, by combining the predictions of various algorithms, while it can detect and classify intrusions in near real-time (0.1 seconds). This study also discusses the practicality and benefits of the proposed digital twin-based security framework.