Can A User Anticipate What Her Followers Want?

Whenever a social media user decides to share a story, she is typically pleased to receive likes, comments, shares, or, more generally, feedback from her followers. As a result, she may feel compelled to use the feedback she receives to (re-)estimate her followers' preferences and decides which stories to share next to receive more (positive) feedback. Under which conditions can she succeed? In this work, we first look into this problem from a theoretical perspective and then provide a set of practical algorithms to identify and characterize such behavior in social media. More specifically, we address the above problem from the viewpoint of sequential decision making and utility maximization. For a wide variety of utility functions, we first show that, to succeed, a user needs to actively trade off exploitation-- sharing stories which lead to more (positive) feedback--and exploration-- sharing stories to learn about her followers' preferences. However, exploration is not necessary if a user utilizes the feedback her followers provide to other users in addition to the feedback she receives. Then, we develop a utility estimation framework for observation data, which relies on statistical hypothesis testing to determine whether a user utilizes the feedback she receives from each of her followers to decide what to post next. Experiments on synthetic data illustrate our theoretical findings and show that our estimation framework is able to accurately recover users' underlying utility functions. Experiments on several real datasets gathered from Twitter and Reddit reveal that up to 82% (43%) of the Twitter (Reddit) users in our datasets do use the feedback they receive to decide what to post next.

Can A User Guess What Her Followers Want?

Whenever a social media user decides to share a story, she is typically pleased to receive likes, comments, shares, or, more generally, feedback from her followers. As a result, she may feel compelled to use the feedback she receives to (re-)estimate her followers' preferences and decides which stories to share next to receive more (positive) feedback. Under which conditions can she succeed? In this work, we first investigate this problem from a theoretical perspective and then provide a set of practical algorithms to identify and characterize such behavior in social media. More specifically, we address the above problem from the perspective of sequential decision making and utility maximization. For a wide family of utility functions, we first show that, to succeed, a user needs to actively trade off exploitation-- sharing stories which lead to more (positive) feedback--and exploration-- sharing stories to learn about her followers' preferences. However, exploration is not necessary if a user utilizes the feedback her followers provide to other users in addition to the feedback she receives. Then, we develop a utility estimation framework for observation data, which relies on statistical hypothesis testing to determine whether a user utilizes the feedback she receives from each of her followers to decide what to post next. Experiments on synthetic data illustrate our theoretical findings and show that our estimation framework is able to accurately recover users' underlying utility functions. Experiments on several real datasets gathered from Twitter and Reddit reveal that up to 82% (43%) of the Twitter (Reddit) users in our datasets do use the feedback they receive to decide what to post next.

Interactive Teaching Algorithms for Inverse Reinforcement Learning

We study the problem of inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) with the added twist that the learner is assisted by a helpful teacher. More formally, we tackle the following algorithmic question: How could a teacher provide an informative sequence of demonstrations to an IRL learner to speed up the learning process? We present an interactive teaching framework where a teacher adaptively chooses the next demonstration based on learner's current policy. In particular, we design teaching algorithms for two concrete settings: an omniscient setting where a teacher has full knowledge about the learner's dynamics and a blackbox setting where the teacher has minimal knowledge. Then, we study a sequential variant of the popular MCE-IRL learner and prove convergence guarantees of our teaching algorithm in the omniscient setting. Extensive experiments with a car driving simulator environment show that the learning progress can be speeded up drastically as compared to an uninformative teacher.

Learner-aware Teaching: Inverse Reinforcement Learning with Preferences and Constraints

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) enables an agent to learn complex behavior by observing demonstrations from a (near-)optimal policy. The typical assumption is that the learner's goal is to match the teacher's demonstrated behavior. In this paper, we consider the setting where the learner has her own preferences that she additionally takes into consideration. These preferences can for example capture behavioral biases, mismatched worldviews, or physical constraints. We study two teaching approaches: learner-agnostic teaching, where the teacher provides demonstrations from an optimal policy ignoring the learner's preferences, and learner-aware teaching, where the teacher accounts for the learner's preferences. We design learner-aware teaching algorithms and show that significant performance improvements can be achieved over learner-agnostic teaching.

Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior

We are witnessing an increasing use of data-driven predictive models to inform decisions. As decisions have implications for individuals and society, there is increasing pressure on decision makers to be transparent about their decision policies, models, and the features they use. At the same time, individuals may use knowledge, gained by transparency, to invest effort strategically in order to maximize their chances of receiving a beneficial decision. In this paper, our goal is to find decision policies that are optimal in terms of utility in such a strategic setting. To this end, we first use the theory of optimal transport to characterize how strategic investment of effort by individuals leads to a change in the feature distribution at a population level. Then, we show that, in contrast with the non-strategic setting, optimal decision policies are stochastic, and we cannot expect to find them in polynomial time. Finally, we derive an efficient greedy algorithm that is guaranteed to find locally optimal decision policies in polynomial time. Experiments on synthetic and real lending data illustrate our theoretical findings and show that the decision policies found by our greedy algorithm achieve higher utility than deterministic threshold rules, which are optimal policies in a non-strategic setting.

Unifying Ensemble Methods for Q-learning via Social Choice Theory

Ensemble methods have been widely applied in Reinforcement Learning (RL) in order to enhance stability, increase convergence speed, and improve exploration. These methods typically work by employing an aggregation mechanism over actions of different RL algorithms. We show that a variety of these methods can be unified by drawing parallels from committee voting rules in Social Choice Theory. We map the problem of designing an action aggregation mechanism in an ensemble method to a voting problem which, under different voting rules, yield popular ensemble-based RL algorithms like Majority Voting Q-learning or Bootstrapped Q-learning. Our unification framework, in turn, allows us to design new ensemble-RL algorithms with better performance. For instance, we map two diversity-centered committee voting rules, namely Single Non-Transferable Voting Rule and Chamberlin-Courant Rule, into new RL algorithms that demonstrate excellent exploratory behavior in our experiments.

Learning to Collaborate in Markov Decision Processes

We consider a two-agent MDP framework where agents repeatedly solve a task in a collaborative setting. We study the problem of designing a learning algorithm for the first agent (A1) that facilitates a successful collaboration even in cases when the second agent (A2) is adapting its policy in an unknown way. The key challenge in our setting is that the presence of the second agent leads to non-stationarity and non-obliviousness of rewards and transitions for the first agent. We design novel online learning algorithms for agent A1 whose regret decays as $O(T^{1-\frac{3}{7} \cdot \alpha})$ with $T$ learning episodes provided that the magnitude of agent A2's policy changes between any two consecutive episodes are upper bounded by $O(T^{-\alpha})$. Here, the parameter $\alpha$ is assumed to be strictly greater than $0$, and we show that this assumption is necessary provided that the {\em learning parity with noise} problem is computationally hard. We show that sub-linear regret of agent A1 further implies near-optimality of the agents' joint return for MDPs that manifest the properties of a {\em smooth} game.

Efficient learning of smooth probability functions from Bernoulli tests with guarantees

We study the fundamental problem of learning an unknown, smooth probability function via point-wise Bernoulli tests. We provide the first scalable algorithm for efficiently solving this problem with rigorous guarantees. In particular, we prove the convergence rate of our posterior update rule to the true probability function in L2-norm. Moreover, we allow the Bernoulli tests to depend on contextual features, and provide a modified inference engine with provable guarantees for this novel setting. Numerical results show that the empirical convergence rates match the theory, and illustrate the superiority of our approach in handling contextual features over the state-of-the-art.