FlowPalm: Optical Flow Driven Non-Rigid Deformation for Geometrically Diverse Palmprint Generation

Recently, synthetic palmprints have been increasingly used as substitutes for real data to train recognition models. To be effective, such synthetic data must reflect the diversity of real palmprints, including both style variation and geometric variation. However, existing palmprint generation methods mainly focus on style translation, while geometric variation is either ignored or approximated by simple handcrafted augmentations. In this work, we propose FlowPalm, an optical-flow-driven palmprint generation framework capable of simulating the complex non-rigid deformations observed in real palms. Specifically, FlowPalm estimates optical flows between real palmprint pairs to capture the statistical patterns of geometric deformations. Building on these priors, we design a progressive sampling process that gradually introduces the geometric deformations during diffusion while maintaining identity consistency. Extensive experiments on six benchmark datasets demonstrate that FlowPalm significantly outperforms state-of-the-art palmprint generation approaches in downstream recognition tasks. Project page: https://yuchenzou.github.io/FlowPalm/

A semantic backdoor attack against Graph Convolutional Networks

Graph Convolutional Networks (GCNs) have been very effective in addressing the issue of various graph-structured related tasks, such as node classification and graph classification. However, extensive research has shown that GCNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. One of the security threats facing GCNs is the backdoor attack, which hides incorrect classification rules in models and activates only when the model encounters specific inputs containing special features (e.g., fixed patterns like subgraphs, called triggers), thus outputting incorrect classification results, while the model behaves normally on benign samples. The semantic backdoor attack is a type of the backdoor attack where the trigger is a semantic part of the sample; i.e., the trigger exists naturally in the original dataset and the attacker can pick a naturally occurring feature as the backdoor trigger, which causes the model to misclassify even unmodified inputs. Meanwhile, it is difficult to detect even if the attacker modifies the input samples in the inference phase as they do not have any anomaly compared to normal samples. Thus, semantic backdoor attacks are more imperceptible than non-semantic ones. However, existed research on semantic backdoor attacks has only focused on image and text domains, which have not been well explored against GCNs. In this work, we propose a black-box Semantic Backdoor Attack (SBA) against GCNs. We assign the trigger as a certain class of nodes in the dataset and our trigger is semantic. Through evaluation on several real-world benchmark graph datasets, the experimental results demonstrate that our proposed SBA can achieve almost 100% attack success rate under the poisoning rate less than 5% while having no impact on normal predictive accuracy.